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In December 2019, performance artist David Datuna ate a $120,000 banana duct-taped to 
the wall of a public exhibition at Art Basel Miami Beach. The duct-taped banana was not Datuna’s 
creation, and he had not paid $120,000 for it. Videos of his intrepid stunt soon circulated around the 
internet with captions like “Datuna’s actions have inspired me.” News outlets weighed in with 
simmering disgust for price movements in the art market. The Financial Times professed that “the 
sale of a piece of fruit for $120,000 is a symptom of a world untethered from reality,” NPR quipped 
“This art is bananas,” and Business Insider journalist Alec Recinos argued the banana illustrates “that 
the market-driven world of contemporary art is driven not by merit or quality, but instead by 
financial speculation.” 
Intentionally or not, Recinos’s complaint about art prices uses the economic definition of a 
bubble to diagnose the art market’s problems. A bubble in a given asset class is generally defined as 
“a deviation of prices above fundamental value,” in which price increases are sustained by 
“speculative trading activity” (Botsch and Jalil, 2018). So, if each piece of art has some “merit or 
quality” that dictates its fundamental value, and art prices exhibit a sustained rise due to speculative 
purchases instead of changes in the “merit or quality” of the art being sold, the art market would be 
in a bubble. A bubble in the art market would have important implications. The art market is large – 
it likely accounts for almost ten percent of the wealth of high income households (Barclays, 2012).  
This paper will examine whether Recinos is correct and there is an art market bubble. 
 Several recent papers have attempted to identify art market bubbles. Kräussl et al. (2016), 




then employed different varieties of augmented Dickey-Fuller tests to check for explosiveness in art 
prices. Kräussl et al. (2016) are the first to employ this blueprint and find evidence of a speculative 
bubble in several 2013 art markets: “Impressionist and Modern,” “Post-War and Contemporary,” 
“Old Masters,” and “American.” Assaf (2018) finds less evidence for bubbles since the Great 
Recession but identifies bubbles in a range of markets before 2008. Li et al. (2020) identify bubbles 
in the Chinese art market from 2004 to 2005 and 2010 to 2011.  
Instead of testing new art markets for bubbles, my paper reevaluates price movements in the 
“Impressionist and Modern,” “Post-War and Contemporary,” “American,” “Old Masters,” and 
“19th Century European” painting markets. My study makes two fundamental changes to the 
framework that Kräussl et al., Assaf, and Li et al. use: First, it assigns unsold (or “bought-in”) 
paintings a market price and includes them in the indexes. More than 30% of paintings go unsold at 
auction, and recent theoretical models of buyer behavior in the art market suggest that failing to 
price unsold paintings might bias price indexes (Lovo and Spaenjers, 2018). This paper tests both 
whether that bias exists, and whether accounting for that bias changes the outcome of tests for 
bubbles. Second, my analysis employs two tests for the presence of bubbles: the conventional 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test, and a second “significant year” test that proxies for changes in the 
underlying demand for art and then checks whether art prices have risen significantly in any years 
after controlling for this demand. Both tests are estimated over indexes based on sold paintings only, 
as well as indexes based on sold and bought-in paintings.  
This paper’s findings suggest that there is no current art market bubble, but that there is 
strong and consistent evidence for a bubble in the Post-War and Contemporary painting market 
shortly before the Great Recession. While both the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the “significant 




also persisted for several years after 2008. Including bought-ins in index construction reduces but 
does not eliminate both tests’ evidence for this bubble. Finally, as might be expected, the results 
indicate that bought-ins reduce the index returns of high performing markets.  
2. Theoretical Framework  
A. The nature of asset-price bubbles 
It is widely accepted that speculation can drive asset prices above their fundamental value 
(Tirole (1985), Gürkaynak (2008), and Botsch and Jalil (2018)). However, whether “pure bubbles” – 
episodes in which speculative factors alone sustain price increases – have ever existed is unclear 
(Botsch and Jalil, 2018). There is even evidence that fundamentals drove prices during several 
infamous “bubbles.” Garber (1989, 1990) argues that the “Tulip Mania” and “South Sea Bubble” 
episodes were driven by an increased probability of future cash flows. Michael Lewis (2002) offers a 
similar explanation for the dot-com bubble. However, there has been considerable pushback to 
these explanations: Kindleberger (2000) notes that while Garber provides a fundamentals-based 
justification for the price increases of exotic tulips, he cannot explain why garden-variety tulips 
soared in price during the Dutch tulip craze of 1636 and 1637. Perez (2009) contends that extreme 
price to earnings ratios of technology stocks in the 1990s were driven by “excess confidence in the 
paper economy.” After thoroughly surveying literature on the nature of bubbles, Botsch and Jalil 
(2018) argue that fundamental and speculation-based changes in asset prices often occur alongside 
one another. For example, in the 1920s land prices in Florida spiked, partially due to a population 
influx that contributed to underlying demand for land, and partially due to “feverish" buying and 
reselling on the part of investors who drove prices to “fictitious” levels (Botsch and Jalil, 2018). This 
speculative buying and reselling does not necessarily have to be “irrational.” Investors might drive 




based on just their intuition (i.e., irrationality), but they might also act rationally and drive prices 
above their fundamental value due to a market imperfect, such as different priors (Tirole (1982) and 
Barlevy (2007)).  
Given that a bubble is an episode in which prices in an asset class exceed their fundamental 
value for a sustained period, it is crucial to determine what the “fundamental value” of an asset 
means. Economic theory provides that the value of an asset is equal to the present discounted value 
of an asset’s future cash flows:  




where Pt* is the price of an asset at time t, r is the real interest rate, and D is the constant dividend an 
asset yields every period until the asset’s sale in period t+1. Pt+1 must then also be a function of D, r, 
and Pt+2, so that for Pt+n, as n →  ∞ (i.e. an infinite time horizon), Pt* becomes entirely a function of 
D and r. Assuming Pt* is the price of an asset that corresponds with its fundamental value, the price, 
Pt, of an asset at any given time, can be written as: 
Pt = Pt* + Bt , 
where Bt is the “bubble component” of Pt that may or may not be equal to zero. If a bubble does not 
exist, Bt = B0 = 0, so that Pt = Pt*. If a bubble does exist, Bt = (1+r)t B0 > 0, for each period of the 
bubble. It is important to note that the existence of any Bt does not require that prices eventually 
collapse – prices have gradually “fizzled out” instead of collapsing (Botsch and Jalil, 2018). 
B. What is “the fundamental value” of art? 
Determining the fundamental value of art is notoriously difficult due to the heterogeneity of 
different pieces sold, and the buyer’s heterogeneous preferences. Ultimately, the value of a work is a 




potential for future utility, is nearly impossible. Formally, Vijt*, the “fundamental value” of a piece of 





where EDi,j  are the “emotional dividends” (i.e. utility) that individual j receives from owning the 
painting i, Pit’ - AF is the difference between the price of painting i at time of resell t’ and any fees 
AF that may go into maintaining or reselling the painting. V(.) is simply an operator that converts 
both emotional dividends and prices to units that measure value generally. Vijt* can thereby be 
converted to Pijt*, a price that corresponds with the fundamental value of piece of art, i, at time t, to 
individual j. Lastly, 1/(1 + R) is some discount on future utility. Similar to traditional financial assets, 
on an infinite time horizon, Pi,j,t* becomes entirely a function of ED, AF, and R, but whereas D and r 
are constant across individuals for traditional assets, ED and R vary based on the heterogenous 
preferences of each owner i, making Pi,t* difficult to determine with accuracy. In a perfectly efficient 
market, the buyer who receives the highest discounted value at time t from owning painting i would 
own i at t, maximizing Vit* and thereby also maximizing Pit*.  
The term “emotional dividends” is used by Spaenjers et al. (2015), but the same idea is 
presented by both Campbell (2008) who calls them “dividends of enjoyment” and Gerard-Varet 
(1995) who terms them “aesthetic pleasure.” While the concept is cloaked in odd phrases, it is 
simple: people enjoy owning art, and this enjoyment constitutes art’s value. In this regard, the value 
of art is no different from the value of any durable consumable good. Art is distinct from some 
consumable goods though, because its value can appreciate even as it is “consumed,” and thus it 
shares characteristics of financial assets (Stein 1977).  
Art is therefore not some inherently “bubbly” asset with no real value: If someone receives 




fundamental value of the duct-taped banana is at least $120,000. However, if buyers are consistently 
paying more for art than the amount that corresponds with the “emotional dividends” they receive 
from owning it plus the sum of the discounted emotional dividends that all future buyers might 
receive from owning it (i.e., Pit’), then prices would exceed Pt* and some Bt greater than zero would 
exist.1 This process does not require that art bubbles dissipate immediately – an investor might 
misjudge the discounted utility all future buyers will receive from owning a piece of art, but another 
investor might make the same mistake and repurchase the art at a Pit’ that rewards the first investor.  
Some investors might recognize that the discounted emotional dividends of all future buyers are less 
than the purchase price of a painting but nonetheless know that other investors will misjudge future 
emotional dividends more severely.  Accordingly, as in other markets, art bubbles can be driven by 
irrational speculators who are too confident about their estimation of the future utility people might 
receive from owning a painting, or bubbles may be driven by speculators who are acting rationality 
in an imperfect market. Because the art market is particularly imperfect – it is illiquid and there are 
great asymmetries of information (Penasse and Renneboog, 2016) – it is particularly prone to 
bubbles.2 
C. Identifying bubbles in the art market 
i. The SADF Approach 
Given the difficulty of determining the “fundamental value” of art across an entire market, 
attempting to test for the presence of bubbles in the art market might strike one as foolhardy. 
However, Kräussl et al. (2016) suggest bubbles in the art market might be detected using modified 
                                                          
1 A bubble could also exist if art investors accurately gauge the discounted future emotional dividends buyers will receive 
from owning a painting but underestimate the auction fee necessary to resell the painting However, this scenario is 
unlikely because while there are asymmetries of information about “seller’s commissions” these fees have empirically 
been constant (see section 2Ciii.). 
2 See Barlevy (2007) for a description of how such imperfection can prompt bubbles even when investors act rationally. 




augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. This approach is also used by Assaf (2018) and Li et al. (2020).  
Without having to gauge the fundamental value of art in a market, we know the price of art, Pt , 
equals Pt* + Bt.  A wealth of literature3 suggests that if Bt > 0 in a given market, asset prices will 
exhibit explosive behavior, because the presence of Bt will lead to a stochastic process in which the 
expected value of prices in period t+1 will be greater than or equal to prices in t (Areal, 2013).  
Kräussl et al. (2016) uses a recent approach developed by Philips et al. in two papers (2011, 
2014) to test for non-stationarity. This paper employs a similar test: 
H0 : yt= α෤T
-η + δyt-1+ εt, δ=1  
HA: yt= δyt-1+ εt, δ>1 , 
where yt is some measure of prices at time t, α෤T-η is an intercept that converges to zero as T →  ∞, εt 
is the error term, and δ is an autoregressive coefficient that will = 1 if prices have a unit root but will 
exceed 1 if price movements are explosive. Therefore, rejecting H0 suggests that a market is 
exhibiting bubble-like behavior.  α෤T-η  is included in H0 to allow for some drift in the data and 
depends on a population parameter η ∈ [0,1].  
Instead of using a single augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to find a single δ for the entire 
index, this paper follows Philips et al. (2014) and Kräussl et al. (2016) and uses a series of forward 
recursive calculations of ADF statistics. Forward recursive calculations require choosing an initial 
fraction of observations, r0: 0 < r0 < 1, and expanding r until running the ADF regression for every 
possible recursive sample and obtaining the full sequence of test statistics, ADFr: r ∈ (r0,1). Using 
ADFr as opposed to a single ADF statistic for the entire model, helps to both identify the start and 
end date of episodes and to identify multiple bubbles. These forward recursive regressions are called 
                                                          




a “Sup ADF test” or “SADF,” because they generate a test statistic, SADF(r0):= supr∈[r0,1]ADFr, 
where sup is synonymous with “max.” The augmented Dickey-Fuller test used to recursively 
calculate ADFr for any sample window size follows: 
yt= α+ δyt-1+ ∑ Øi
k
i=1 ∆yt-i+ εt, 
where α is an intercept, k is the lag order, δ is the unit root, Ø௜ is the coefficient on each lagged 
regressor ∆y௧ି௜ , εt is the error term, and the model is estimated using ordinary least squares. The 
ADF test statistic, ADFr0 = 𝛿መ / SE(δ෠), and after finding ADFr0 the process is repeated for all ADFr: r 
∈ (r0,1). 
Philips et al. (2014) provides asymptotic critical values for the SADF statistics based on 𝜂 
(Table 4), which this paper uses to determine the presence of a bubble.4  If H0 is rejected, Phillips et 
al. (2011) recommends using a separate set of critical values to determine the start and end date of a 
bubble, such that if rn is the origination date and rc is the collapse of a bubble, rn > rc, ADFrn > 
CV𝑟n, and ADFrc < CVrc, where CV standards for critical value. The separate critical values come 
from the asymptotic ADF test statistic distribution, which this paper derives through 100,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations. They are found in table 4.  
ii. The “Significant Year” Test 
This paper also employs a separate test for the presence of bubbles, which uses equity 
market performance to control for portions of aggregate art demand. An abundance of literature has 
demonstrated that equity market movements affect art prices. In a sweeping analysis of art prices 
from 1830 to 2007, Goetzmann et al. (2010) find a weak relationship between total income (GDP) 
                                                          




and art price trends, but strong evidence for a positive lagged relationship between equity market 
and art market movements. Similarly, Hiraki et al. (2009) discover a robust correlation between 
Japanese stock prices and demand for art in more recent periods. Renneboog and Spaenjers (2015) 
also find that risk in international art markets is positively related to risk in international equity 
markets. 
Art prices are positively correlated with equity markets because fluctuations in equity 
markets affect the income of the wealthy – the potential art buyers.5 Potential art buyers are more 
likely to buy art if they are wealthier. Risk-averse individuals’ willingness to pay for “irreplaceable 
goods” (goods like art for which there is no perfect substitute) increases with their wealth (Cook and 
Graham 1977). Additionally, several empirical studies have shown that the marginal utility of 
consuming luxury goods is correlated positively with wealth creation (Aït-Sahalia et al. 2004 and 
Hiraki et al. 2009). Lovo and Spaenjers (2018) frame these as reasons the “emotional dividends” of 
art ownership increase with wealth. Using this framework, we can think of emotional dividends 
(ED) across an art market as 
EDm,t = f ((Stock Market Performance)t-1, (buyer tastes)t, (painting quality)t ), 
for all agents in market m at time t. Beyond these variables – different tastes, different qualities of 
paintings, and a measure of wealth accumulation – there is very little anecdotally or in literature on 
the art market that indicates any other factors might affect how much art is “enjoyed” aggregately in 
a market. Given that supply is fixed in non-contemporary art markets (artists are dead), controlling 
for how much buyers might aggregately enjoy paintings offered in a given period (t) relative to a 
previous period should control for everything that might affect P*tm – the “fundamental” price of art 
                                                          
5 Art buyers are more likely to be wealthy (Barclays, 2012), and the wealthy earn a bigger share of income from investing 




in market m in period t.6 In contemporary art markets, this relationship is different because aggregate 
supply might increase between periods as artists produce new work. Assuming the demand curve for 
art slopes downward, after effectively controlling for the heterogenous qualities of these new works 
(along with the other determinants of demand), prices should slowly decrease in contemporary art 
markets over time.  
To test for the presence of bubbles, this paper constructs a pricing index that controls for 
stock market performance and for heterogenous qualities of paintings across time.7  It then tests the 
following null and alternative hypothesis: 
H0: (𝑃෨m, y+n  -  𝑃෨m,y) = 0 
Ha: (𝑃෨m, y+n  -  𝑃෨m,y)  > 0, 
where 𝑃෨m, y+n  is a measure of prices in art market m at year y + n after controlling for both heterogenous 
qualities of paintings in year y + n relative to base year y and stock market performance since some 
year y, and 𝑃෨m,y is a measure of prices in some reference/base period y.  
Rejecting H0 indicates that prices in market m have risen even after the wealth of buyers in 
market m and the quality of paintings in market m is held constant, and thus suggests a bubble is 
present. 𝑃෨ y, t+n   -  𝑃෨m,y can therefore be thought of as some approximation of Bt in the equation Pt = 
Pt* + Bt. This paper repeats the test for all years y +n. A bubble may thereby manifest over a single 
year, if  𝑃෨ y, t+n   -  𝑃෨ y,t is statistically significant for any year y+n.8 
                                                          
6 This assumes that for Vijt* = 
V(EDij) +V(Pit'-AF)
1 +R
 , AF is constant. This assumption is addressed on the following page. 
7 Development of this index is described in “Data and Index Construction.” I use a version of the index that controls 
for heterogenous painting qualities but does not control for stock market performance to run SADF tests. 
8 While a single year might seem like a short time for sustained speculative movements to drive prices over their 
fundamental value, many historic bubbles have manifested over a single year. Botsch and Jalil (2018) identify bubbles in 
the railroad stock (1885), Silver (1890), Cotton (1903), war stocks (1915), sugar (1920), and grain (1924) markets that 




In addition to the assumption that controlling for stock market performance controls for art 
demand due to increases in wealth, this test requires three other assumptions. First, the aggregate 
“taste” of buyers for art in a given market is constant after controlling for stock market performance 
and painting quality. For example, if 1995 is the base year t, t+n is 2005, and m is the Old Masters 
market, then I am assuming that buyers in aggregate will not receive any bigger or smaller emotional 
dividends from purchasing Old Masters art in 1995 than they did in 2005, after controlling for stock 
market performance since 1995 and any differences in the quality of Old Master paintings sold in 
1995 versus 2005. This assumption would be violated by “fads” that affect aggregate taste for 
paintings in a market. However, many of the fads that have been discovered for various art markets 
seem to be a function of changes in wealth – for example, Hiraki et al. (2009) shows that strong 
stock market performance in Japan in the 1980s led to preferences for Impressionist and Modern 
Art. Additionally, each genre that this paper examines encompasses many art movements and may 
thereby be less sensitive to fads than ultra-specific markets. For example, it is true that in the 1980s, 
Japanese art buyers increasingly enjoyed “Impressionist and Modern” art. However, “Impressionist 
and Modern” art includes impressionist, post-impressionist, expressionist, fauvist, cubist, surrealist, 
and art deco movements (and others). Intuitively, fads that affect the market for one of these 
movements must not necessarily affect the markets for all.  
Second, I assume that the anticipated fees required to maintain and resell a piece of art are 
constant. The fundamental value of art as described previously is a function of both emotional 
dividends and anticipated fees, so if fees are decreasing, the fundamental value of a piece of art 
should increase and vice versa. Fortunately, while “buyer’s premiums” – the fee buyers have to pay 
an auction house for purchasing a painting – have incrementally increased in auction markets 
Spaenjers et al. (2015), the “seller’s commission” – the fee sellers have to pay auction houses – have 




not publicized by auction houses, and are often negotiated individually with sellers (Ashenfelter and 
Graddy, 2006), so it seems unlikely that on aggregate buyers in two different periods would expect 
seller’s commissions to differ. Furthermore, there is no empirical or anecdotal evidence that fees 
paid to maintain art are have increased or decreased relative to the value of the art itself.  
Lastly, the test requires that the art market is not in a bubble in base year t. If a market’s base 
year were a bubble year, the tests would be subject to type II errors. This paper uses existing 
literature to identify a base year in which art markets acted normally. 9 
If these assumptions hold, any difference between Pm,t+n  and  Pm,t would indicate the 
presence of a bubble – price movements not due to underlying demand for art, but due to 
speculation about future resale prices. However, because the assumptions do not have a robust basis 
in existing art market literature, the paper employs the “significant year” test as a complement to its 
SADF tests rather than a be-all check for bubbles. 
D. Bought-Ins  
 A crucial omission in previous art market literature is that researchers have paid little 
attention to bought-in paintings. This paper evaluates whether accounting for bought-ins in art price 
index construction changes the outcome of tests for bubbles. Paintings are “bought-in” when 
bidding does not reach a confidential reserve price set by the seller and the auction house. In art 
auctions, the reserve price is set at or below the auctioneer’s low estimate of a painting’s value 
(Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2011). Potential buyers see the low estimate, but not the reserve price.  
A substantial portion of auctioned art is bought-in. However, there is little research on 
studying bought-in rates and their impact on art pricing (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2011). In fact, 
                                                          




while surveying art market literature for this paper, I found no estimates of overall buy-in rates.10 
This paper finds 32% of paintings in its sample of auction sales across five art genres were bought-in 
between 1995 and the end of 2019. Prestigious auction houses are not immune to buy-ins: according 
to the Artnet database, 29% of painting sales at Sotheby’s and 25% at Christie’s New York auction 
houses have been bought-in between 1995 and the end of 2019, respectively.  
Some papers have found that buy-ins can “burn” the value of a piece of art and temporarily 
make it difficult to resell at a high price (Beggs and Graddy, 2008). Ashenfelter and Graddy (2011) 
estimate the average reserve price to be 70% of the low estimate and find that price shocks and 
auction sale rates are correlated. Other papers have used buy-in rates to extrapolate other findings, 
for example whether expert appraisals of art before auctions are unbiased indicators of market value 
(McAndrew et al., 2012). But art market index construction has typically failed to price bought-in 
paintings. Kräussl et al. (2016), Assaf (2018), and Li et al. (2020) employ indexes of sold paintings to 
test whether there is a bubble in the art market, and do not speculate about the effect of leaving out 
bought-ins. Similarly, none of the other recent art market indexes – constructed by Hiraki et al. 
(2009), Goetzmann et al. (2010), Renneboog and Spaenjers (2015), and Spaenjers et al. (2015) – 
account for the effect of bought-ins on art price movement.   
Although there are few attempts to quantify the effect of unsold paintings on art market 
indexes, a paper on the real estate market attempts to account for the effect of unsold houses on real 
estate prices. Goetzman and Peng (2006) estimate the “reservation” (reserve) prices that owners 
who choose not to sell their houses hold, and incorporate these prices into their indexes. Their 
model is specific to the housing market, and they attempt to account for all privately held reserve 
                                                          
10 I could find no estimates of overall bought-in rates in academic literature. However, the art database ArtPrice 
estimates that 38% of total art went unsold in 2018 and 2019. This unsold rate may differ from the paper’s because it is 




prices on the market, not just the reserve prices of houses that go on the market and fail to sell. Still, 
some of their findings have important implications for the art market. They find that after building a 
“reserve-conditional” index – which accounts for the reserve prices of unsold houses – and testing it 
against a conventional index, “reserve-conditional” indexes are more volatile especially during 
downturns, have smaller autoregressive coefficients, and have lower returns when trading volume 
decreases.11 This suggest that SADF t-statistics – which quantify the likelihood of stochastic trends – 
might be negatively impacted by developing indices that price bought-ins at their privately held 
reserve price.  
Recent art market literature has also suggested that failing to account for bought-in art will 
bias indexes. When a painting fails to sell, the market is pricing it below the lowest price for which 
its seller is willing to sell. Intuitively, failing to account for the prices of bought ins will lead to an 
inflated estimate of art prices. This is confirmed by Lovo and Spaenjers’ (2018) theoretical model of 
trading in the art market, who describe the exclusion of bought-in paintings a “sample selection 
bias.” Their model also suggests that failing to account for bought-ins could lead to inflated 
estimates of art market returns. They build a model of art buyers and sellers with two basic 
participants: “collectors” and “flippers.”12 Collectors are standard art buyers. For a collector, j, the 
value of painting i is:  
Vijt* = 
V(EDij) +V(Pit' - AF)
1 +R
, 
as defined in section 2B. In other words, collectors buy art because they enjoy the art itself, but they 
might resell if they believe the value of reselling is greater than future emotional dividends they will 
                                                          
11 Interestingly, they find that reserve-conditional indexes have higher returns overall than conventional indexes, but 
suggest this might be because they are overestimating trading volume as housing stock grows. 
12 Their full model includes four types of participants: flippers, collectors, investors (who are between flippers and 




receive from owning the art. Collectors are likely to resell during liquidity shocks, which 
simultaneously reduce their enjoyment of owning art and increase the marginal utility they receive 
from each dollar they earn.  
On the other hand, flippers treat art exclusively as a financial investment, such that for a 





In other words, flippers receive little to no “emotional dividends” from art and are investors whose 
sole objective is to profit from the asset. In Lovo and Spaenjers’ (2018) model, flippers are not 
subject to liquidity shocks. Accordingly, they can wait for the opportune time to sell paintings, 
although in Lovo and Spaeners’ model they generally resell quickly. Flippers will only buy painting i 
if they believe they can resell it for more than their purchase price, and therefore they will generally 
set higher reserve prices when they resell paintings than collectors.  
An index based on “sold” paintings will include the successful attempts of flippers to “flip” 
art, and exclude unsuccessful attempts, and therefore result in indexes that often overstate returns 
during certain periods. This is illustrated by both Figure 1p and 2p. Both models consist of only 
flippers who use reserve prices close to the original purchase price of their painting. Indexes that 
price bought-ins capture negative variation in the market value of paintings better than indexes that 
ignore bought-ins. 
Correcting for this sample selection bias requires pricing bought-ins. Pricing bought-ins for 
collectors, who enjoy the art they own and sell during liquidity shocks, is relatively straightforward. 
Because the reserve price of a painting is the lowest possible amount a collector is willing to receive 





Shows a theoretical market for a single painting. After a flipper purchases painting i, its market value dips. 
The flipper unsuccessfully tries to resell, and only later, after underlying demand for the painting has changed, 
successfully resells. The index excluding bought-ins fails to capture any of the negative variation in market 




Shows a theoretical market in which 12 flippers buy similar paintings and each attempt to resell once. The 
market value of these paintings varies together over time. Indexes that include bought-ins capture more 





However, owners must also pay a seller’s commission, so collector’s actual bid is marginally less than 
the reserve price minus auction fees: 
OBi = RPi(1 – SCh) - ε 
Where OBi is the “owner’s bid” on painting i, RPi is the reserve price for painting i, SCj is the 
auction house h’s seller’s commission rate, and ε is some very small number.  Using Ashenfelter and 
Graddy’s estimate of the reserve prices of paintings (70% of the low estimate), and their findings 
regarding seller’s commissions (10%), OB for any painting i is estimated as: 
OBi = (LEi )(.7) (1 – .1) - ε 
OBj = (LEi)(.63) – ε, 
or 63% of the low estimate for painting i, LEi, minus some negligible constant.   
While a collector’s reserve price is an indication of how much they value the art that they are 
trying to sell, flippers will strategically choose a reserve price based on how they believe the market 
will price their art. Because of this, the reserve price that flippers set is simply an upward bound for 
how they value a painting. Furthermore, as illustrated in Figures 1p and Figure 2p, for flippers the 
market value of unsold paintings is not a constant multiple of the reserve price they choose. Because 
flippers will maintain reserve prices close to the original price at which they bought a painting, the 
reserve prices they set will not necessarily vary with the highs and lows of the market value of their 
painting.  
This makes pricing bought-ins difficult. While in a market of all collectors, 63% of every low 
estimate would provide a good estimate of bought-ins, 63% is simply an upward bound for flippers, 
for which the true value of an unsold painting i at time t is Xit * LEit, where .63 ≥ X ≤ 0, and Xit is 




estimate which paintings are resold by flippers or an Xit for each of these painting in each period. 13 
Instead, it prices every unsold painting at 50% of its low estimate.14 This is an imperfect measure, 
one based on the assumption that flippers exist and therefore, on average, the true value of each 
unsold painting is somewhere below 63% of its low estimate. The estimate does not account for the 
changes in Xit across periods, and therefore will be unable to capture the same negative variation in 
index prices due to bought-ins that an index that consistently prices bought-ins at their true market 
price would. However, pricing bought-ins close to their reserve price will capture some true negative 
variation in prices, as demonstrated by figure 2p. Therefore, this paper’s pricing of bought-ins will 
capture some of their impact, but will likely underestimate their entire effect. 
3. Data and Index Construction 
A. The Hedonic Index Model 
To test for the presence of bubbles and evaluate the effect of pricing bought-ins, this paper 
constructs five art market indexes that extend from 1995 to 2019 for five art genres – “Impressionist 
and Modern,” “Post-War and Contemporary,” “American,” “Old Masters,” and “19 th Century 
European.”15 It also constructs an “Aggregate” index that combines all five genres.  Using these 
                                                          
13 This is because I have data on a relatively small portion of the market, and therefore cannot identify which bought-ins 
were unsuccessful resells. Furthermore, even if I it could identify each bought-in resell, it would be difficult to gauge 
which resold paintings were attempted flips. One could maybe do this by using the ratio of each bought-in’s low 
estimate to its original purchase price and the time between purchase and resell attempt. Lovo and Spaenjers’ model 
suggests that bought-ins of quick attempted resells with high low estimate: original purchase price ratios might have 
reserve prices that don’t reflect their true market value. This is an interesting area for the future exploration of 
economists with full samples of sales in an art market.  
14 Robustness checks ultimately show that pricing bought-ins at 75%, 50% or 25% of their low estimate does not 
significantly alter the effect of bought-ins on index returns. This is not because bought-ins are unimportant – they are. It 
is because indexes of all bought-ins which are priced at constant multiples of their low estimate are all the same (see 3ci 
for a more thorough discussion of this). 




genres helps the paper directly build on the work of Kräussl et al., who examine the same five 
genres.16 
Because paintings are heterogenous assets, any index of art prices must control for the 
heterogeneity in the quality of paintings between periods. Simply using the average prices of 
paintings sold over time will result in biased estimates of art index returns, because it will capture 
variability in prices that are due to the variations in the quality of paintings offered at different times. 
For example, it is likely that “better” paintings are sold during boom periods. If so, average price 
indexes would overstate true art market returns (Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2006).  
Art economists have employed two methods of index construction to avoid this issue. Some 
studies have employed “repeat-sales” indexes, which resolves the problem of heterogeneity by 
estimating returns based on only the purchase and selling price of art pieces that traded twice 
(Spaenjers et al., 2015).   Economists have also developed hedonic pricing models, which use all 
available data on art sales (i.e., not just art pieces with repeated sales) and estimate returns between 
periods after controlling for the “hedonic” characteristics of each painting sold. Both index methods 
are flawed. Paintings may only return to the market if their original buyer believes they have 
appreciated in value (Goetzman, 1996), and studies have shown that repeat sales indexes might have 
to be adjusted downwards (Korteweg et al., 2015). On the other hand, hedonic models might not be 
able to control for all the idiosyncratic characteristics that dictate the “quality” of paintings 
(Ashenfelter and Graddy ,2006). The direction of any inherent bias in hedonic models is unclear 
(Spaenjers et al., 2015). 
                                                          
16 Kräussl et al. also examine a sixth genre – Latin American art. However, the Latin American genre is often grouped 
with either Impressionist and Modern or Post-War and Contemporary art (this is the case at leading auction house 




This paper constructs a hedonic index instead of a repeat-sale index for two reasons. First, 
repeat sales data requires a much larger sample, since most paintings only sell once. Second, this 
paper examines the same markets as Kräussl et al. 2016, who use a hedonic model. A hedonic 
approach in this paper thereby allows for a more direct comparison with Kräussl et al.’s results.  
This paper follows the same general hedonic model specification as Kräussl et al.: 





where a is an intercept, F is the number of factors, Y is the number of years, and the natural log of 
the price, P, of painting i at year y is a function of the sum of its characteristics, Xif, with coefficients 
βf, as well as a function of an annual time dummy variable Diy and slope coefficient λ௬.  
Xif consists of controls for a painting’s artist, the auction house at which it was sold, whether 
the painting is signed, stamped or inscribed by its artist, the size and squared size of the painting, the 
medium (Oil, Pastel, Graphite/Chalk, Fresco, Watercolor, Acrylic, or Other), the material (Canvas, 
Panel, Paper/Cardboard, Metal, or Other). It also controls for whether the painting was certainly 
made by the artist listed, the painting was attributed to that artist, in the manner of that artist, or 
where it was done by a follower of that artist. Other variables include the length of the painting’s 
title and whether it is untitled or titled “composition.” These are all standard controls, and mirror 
many of Kräussl et al.’s hedonic controls. They do include more robust controls for the auction 
houses and artists of paintings offered than Kräussl et al., though. The appendix contains a more 
detailed list of controls with the theoretical motivation behind each.  
I run the regression for all painting sales in each market, and use the estimated coefficients 
of the time dummy variables to construct an art price index for each market from 1995 to 2019. The 




coefficients for each annual dummy variable represents a percentage increase in prices since 1995. 
1995 is a suitable reference year because there is little evidence of a bubble in either the art market or 
stock market during this period.  For each market this regression is run twice: first with prices of all 
sold paintings in a given market, and then with prices of all sold paintings and all bought-in 
paintings, which are each priced at 50% of their low estimate. To finalize each index, I exponentiate 
the estimated coefficients of the time dummy variables, so that the index is set to 100 in 1995. 
This paper uses these indexes for the “SADF Approach” to test for bubbles. However, as 
explained previously, the “Significant Year” test requires controlling for both quality and wealth 
accumulation across periods. Accordingly, to test for significant years the paper employs a hedonic 
model with the addition of a control for stock market performance: 





where all the variables are the same as in the original hedonic model, and Im-1 is a stock 
market index that measures aggregate market returns between January 1995 (the base month of the 
sample) and the month preceding the month of the sale of painting i.17 Whereas Diy is a dummy 
variable for the year y in which painting i was sold, Im-1 corresponds with months in order to control 
for variation in stock market performance within a given year and avoid perfect collinearity between 
the dummy variable for each year and continuous measures of stock market performance.  
B. Data and Sampling 
To construct five art market indexes from 1995 to 2019, I sample over 50,000 auction results 
from 50 separate auction houses using both the Artnet and Askart databases. This leaves roughly 
10,000 auction results for each genre, which are distributed evenly between the sample’s 25 years, so 
                                                          




that each genre has roughly 400 painting sale results per year. The paper opts to only use painting 
sales for two reasons. First, sampling other types of art – like sculptures – would make running a 
single hedonic model impossible, because the hedonic characteristics that help determine the price 
of a painting are different than those that help to determine the price of a sculpture. Second, 
paintings are auctioned more frequently than any other type of art and have made up nearly 60% of 
art transactions since the 1970s according to the Blouin Art database (Kräussl et al, 2016).  
The paper’s sample consists of publicly auctioned sales. Private transactions constitute a 
substantial portion of the art market, but there is little reliable data on them. My study’s indexes 
might therefore not completely capture price movements across an entire art market if there are 
differences between prices in primary art markets and dealer art markets. However, since the mid-
twentieth century there is evidence that some differences between private and public market prices 
have dissipated (Saltzman, 2009).  
Roughly 25% of the final sample consists of auction sales from Christie’s, 25% from 
Sotheby’s, 25% from “large” auction houses, and 25% from “medium/small” auction houses.18 
Christie’s and Sotheby’s are often deemed a duopoly and together account for more than 50% of 
global art market turnover. In 2019, Christie’s accounted for 27.4% of global art market turnover 
and Sotheby’s accounted for 27.0%.19 This is not a recent trend: Christie’s and Sotheby’s have 
dominated global turnover for 250 years (Casadesus-Masanell and Wise, 2010). Auction sale 
turnover declines sharply after Christie’s and Sotheby’s. The next thirteen largest auction houses 
together accounted for 23.0% of global turnover in 2019, and while the third largest (Poly Auctions) 
accounts for 4.6%, the fifteenth largest (Ketterer Kunst) accounts for merely 0.46%.  
                                                          
18 Large and medium/small defined in the “Other Methodology” section of the appendix   




I employ cluster sampling to choose auction houses, and then a “first relevant sale” 
approach to sample sales within auction houses. The first “cluster” consists exclusively of Christie’s 
and Sotheby’s because they are clear market leaders (i.e., no true “sampling” is done to choose 
them). Christie’s and Sotheby’s both have departments specializing in each of the five genres this 
paper evaluates and multiple auctions every year under each genre name. I aim for 400 painting sale 
results per genre per year, with 25% of these Christie’s and 25% Sotheby’s. Accordingly, for each 
genre, I sample the first 100 sale results every year that appear under the genre name for both 
Sotheby’s and Christie’s in their New York auction houses.20 For example, both Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s held sales titled “Old Master Paintings” in 2015. I sample the first 100 results of the first 
Christie’s “Old Masters” sale in 2015 and the first 100 results of the first Sotheby’s “Old Masters” 
sale in 2015. Sampling the first sales of each year is done to help create a consistent gap of time 
between sales in different years. E.g., if I only sampled auctions in April, then the time gap between 
years would always be twelve months. I sample from Christie’s and Sotheby’s New York auction 
houses because they consistently hold the most sales in the paper’s five genres. While this might 
result in some western bias in the sampling of each genre, four of the paper’s five genres are by 
nature European or American. Furthermore, Christie’s and Sotheby’s New York are big enough to 
attract bidders from across the globe: New York auctions at Sotheby’s21 and Christie’s22 often attract 
bidders from 30+ countries. 23 
                                                          
20 There are two years for which I sample sales from both Christie’s and Sotheby’s London auction houses instead of 
New York auction houses. The first was because Christie’s and Sotheby’s New York auction houses did not have Old 
Masters sales for a given year in the Artnet or Artprice database, and the second was because Christie’s and Sotheby’s 
did not have 19th Century European sales for a given year in the Artnet or Artprice database. Despite the differences 
between Christie’s and Sotheby’s New York and London locations, I do not use location controls because there would 
be perfect collinearity between the annual dummy variables and the dummy variables for Christie’s London and 
Sotheby’s London in each genre-based hedonic regression.  
21 A 2016 Sotheby’s New York Contemporary Art Auction of 44 works attracted bidders from 34 different countries. 
22 A 2019 Christie’s New York “interiors” sale registered bidders from 43 countries. 
23 In addition to attracting bids from a wide range of countries, recording breaking sales often take place in New York 
and feature foreign buyers. A Saudi Arabian Prince bought the “Salvatore Mundi” for a record-breaking price at a 




I then take a random sample of large auction houses. After taking this sample, I calculate 
how “specialized” each large auction-house is in a given genre, and for each genre choose a set of 
auction houses that are the most specialized. This generates five separate groups of large auction 
houses, each of which is used to draw a sample of auction sale results for the genre in which the 
group is specialized. 24As with Christie’s or Sotheby’s, for each large auction house group, I sample 
the first 100 auction results with sale titles that mention the name of the group’s genre. There are 
sometimes no sales within a year with titles that mention the name of a group’s genre. In these cases, 
I use the first 100 auction results regardless of a sale title in a given year for the group, in which case 
I classify the genre of each painting manually.25  
I repeat this process for medium/small auction houses. The only notable difference is that 
smaller auction houses are less likely to label their sales with the name of a given genre (e.g., many 
smaller auction houses simply have “emporium” or “premier” auctions). Because of this, 
medium/small auction house sale sampling generally results in choosing the first 100 auction sale in 
a given year, irrespective of sale title. This is why a group of “specialized” auction-houses are chosen 
for each genre – doing so increases the chances that paintings are classified under the genre to which 
their group of auction houses corresponds, and accordingly helps generate a similar number of 
auction results for each genre. This also why results are not distributed exactly evenly between 
genres: when there were no genre-labeled sales in a given year, overall paintings were more likely to 
be manually classified as some genres (Post-War & Contemporary and Impressionist & Modern) 
than other genres (Old Masters, 19th Century European, and American). 
                                                          
at a Christie’s New York sale, and later that year a Chinese investor bought “Nu couché” for another record-breaking 
price at a Christie’s New York sale. This isn’t a recent phenomenon. For example, in 1987, a Japanese investor bought 
Van Gogh’s “Vase with Fifteen Sunflowers” for a record breaking $39.7 million at a Sotheby’s New York auction. 
24 Brief explanation for the motivation behind the “specialization metric” in the next paragraph; additional details in the 
appendix “Other Methodology” section.  




4. Results  
A. Index Returns  
The paper’s art indexes exhibit modest positive returns, largely driven by price increases in the Post-
War & Contemporary market. Returns are highly volatile in each market. Returns are lower in high 
performing markets after accounting for bought-ins, but bought-ins have a mixed effect on lower 
performing markets. Overall, the effect of pricing bought-ins is not completely consistent with the 
theory.  
Since 1995, art prices have risen across all five genres (see Table 2 and Figure 1). In 
aggregate, when excluding bought-in paintings, the five indexes averaged a modest 3.45% annual 
return over the course of 25 years before accounting for inflation. These returns are largely driven 
by the Post-War & Contemporary market (henceforth PW&C), in which prices appreciated at an 
average 7.78% annual clip. PW&C’s outperformance of the aggregate market is consistent with both 
Kräussl et al.’s findings, indexes developed through the entire Artprice database,26 and anecdotal 
evidence. 27 The Old Masters market exhibits moderate returns at 3.26%. American art market 
averages 2.69% returns, but this number is biased by two anomalous years. The 19th Century 
European and Impressionist & Modern markets average 1.62% and 0.24% returns respectively.  The 
underperformance of older markets may be due to a selection effect: collectors are more likely to 
hold on to older high quality works, as are museums. So lower quality works are more likely to be 
trading in these markets, whereas high quality contemporary works still trade (Pogrebin, 2016). This 
does not inherently bias returns – lower quality works could appreciate in price at the same rate as 
higher quality works – but it certain suggests a bias might exist. 
                                                          
26 See Assaf (2018) or Artprice’s “The Contemporary Art Market Report 2018.” 




 After including bought-ins in index construction, aggregate annual returns drop to 3.08%. In 
the two highest performing markets – PW&C and Old Masters – returns fall to 6.95% and 2.64%. 
This is consistent with both the theory and the intuition that suggests failing to account for bought-
ins will positively bias index returns. In lower performing markets, 19th Century European returns 
drop to 1.38%, but returns in the American and Impressionist & Modern markets rise to 2.81% and 
0.68%, respectively. This may be because these markets are less subject to speculation and flipper-
like activity than higher performing markets. Accordingly, accounting for bought-ins in these 
markets might have a smaller negative effect on returns than in markets with frequent failed 
attempts to flip paintings. However, there are some inconsistencies between the expected effect of 
pricing bought-ins (see figures 1A and 2A), and the actual effect on returns. In theory, pricing 
bought-ins accurately should help capture negative price variation and lead to sharper dips in returns 
during market-wide contractions. However, after pricing bought-ins, the minimum values for market 
returns increase in PW&C, Impressionist & Modern, and Old Masters markets. This is likely because 
the paper is pricing bought-in paintings closer to their reserve price than their true market price, and 
thereby not capturing the entire negative effect of bought-ins on returns. 
B. Bubble Detection 
The two tests that this paper employs to identify bubbles both show strong evidence for an episode 
in the PW&C market before the Great Recession. Bought-ins reduce but do not eliminate evidence 
for this bubble. This is consistent with the negative effect of bought-ins on high performing indexes. 
The tests find little evidence for any bubbles in other markets. The effect of bought-ins on these less 






i. SADF Bubble Detection  
SADF t-stats provides evidence of explosive price movements in the Post-War & Contemporary 
art market from 2004 to 2008 at 95% confidence level, and from 2005 to 2008 at a 99% confidence 
level. This suggests the PW&C market exhibited a pre-Great Recession bubble. Bought-ins slightly 
reduce the statistical significance of this bubble. The PW&C SADF score drops from 2.17 to 1.95 
after accounting for bought-ins, but still meets the SADF >99% critical value of 1.77. Additionally, 
the ADF stats that this paper tests against a separate set of critical values to determine the start and 
end date of the bubble do not change after accounting for bought-ins enough to alter the start and 
end dates of SADF-based bubbles.   
SADF output is statistically insignificant in the 19th Century European, American, Impressionist 
& Modern, and Old Masters market (Tables III and IV). This suggests these markets have not been 
subject to speculative bubbles since at least 2004 and is consistent with their relatively low index 
returns. Accounting for bought-ins in these markets has an inconsistent effect on SADF t-stats: 
Bought-ins reduces the SADF score for the American market but slightly increases SADF scores in 
the Impressionist & Modern, 19th Century European, and Old Masters markets. This is unexpected. 
Bought-ins reduce average annual returns in the 19th Century European and Old Masters market (as 
described in section 4.A), which one would expect to correlate with lower SADF scores. However, 
SADF scores only correspond with one year of the index, so indexes with higher average returns 
might still happen to have a single year in which the ADF regression yields a particularly high score.  
The SADF test finds no evidence of bubbles after 2008 in PW&C, American, Old Masters, and 
Impressionist & Modern markets. These results differ from those of Kräussl et al. for two primary 
reasons. First, while this paper follows Kräussl et al.’s general hedonic approach to index 




each artist with paintings sold in more than one year) and further controls for the effect of auction 
houses on prices (dummy variables for each auction house with significant observations across more 
than one year). Kräussl et al. include a dummy variable for whether a painting’s artist was alive at the 
time of sale, and a dummy variable for whether the painting was sold at Christie’s or Sotheby’s, but 
otherwise do not attempt to capture the variation in prices due to the heterogenous effects of artists 
or auction houses across years. Second, their index uses 1970, not 1995, as a base year. Because art 
prices were much higher in 1995 than in 1970, changes in prices in the 2000s are bigger relative to 
prices in 1970 than to prices in 1995. Using 1970 as a base year might thereby make price 
movements in the 2000s look more explosive and trigger higher SADF statistics than using 1995.  
Other literature helps confirms the validity of this paper’s results. The only other paper to run a 
SADF test on a genre that Kräussl et al. and my study both examine – Assaf et al. (2018), who tests 
the Old Masters market – finds no evidence for a bubble before 2008 or since 2008. 28 Furthermore, 
while Kräussl et al. find consistent, strong, upward price movement between 2009 and 2014 in each 
of the genres they test, Spaenjers et al. (2016) find that aggregate art prices declined slightly between 
2009 and 2013.29 Spaenjers and Lovo (2018) update this index and find that aggregate art prices have 
leveled off since 2009. Similarly, this paper finds some upward price movement between 2009 and 
2014, primarily in the PW&C market, but overall returns are inconsistent and relatively flat 
compared to Kräussl et al., even before controlling for bought-ins. This suggests that my study’s lack 
of SADF-based evidence for bubbles in the PW&C, American, Old Masters, and Impressionist & 
                                                          
28 Assaf (2018) also tests the Contemporary, Post-War, and Modern markets for bubbles. He finds no evidence for a 
Contemporary bubble since 2008, but finds some evidence that a Post-War bubble and a Modern bubble formed around 
2011. However, these genres are defined differently than the genres that Kräussl et al. and this paper examine. 
Furthermore, he uses quarterly price data, and lower critical SADF t-scores. The SADF t-stats he does obtain for these 
periods are lower than the critical values Phillips et al. (2014) recommends and this paper uses, and lower than the 
critical values Kräussl et al. (2016) use. 




Modern since the Great Recession is more consistent with other existing indexes than Kräussl et 
al’s.  
ii. “Significant year” bubble detection  
Overall, the “significant year” test provides little relevant evidence for bubbles in four of this 
paper’s five genre-based markets, but supports evidence of a bubble in the PW&C market before the 
Great Recession. It also suggests that this bubble continued through 2009. This demonstrates the 
importance of the “significant year” test: while ADF scores fell in 2009, PW&C art prices had a 
relatively good year: prices were high after controlling for how stock market performance should 
have curbed demand. Including bought-ins also reduces the number of “significant years” for 
bubbles in the PW&C market. This strengthens the evidence from SADF tests that accounting for 
bought-ins diminishes the explosiveness of price increases in high performing markets. 
It might initially appear as if the “significant year” approach has helped detect a multitude of 
bubbles across different markets (see Table 6). This is not the case. Contrary to what this paper’s 
theoretical framework would suggest, the variable it uses to control for stock market performance is 
statistically insignificant in the Old Masters, 19th Century European, and Impressionist & Modern 
markets (see Appendix tables 4A and 5A). In these markets, the stock performance variable often 
varies negatively with the natural log of painting prices, thereby leading to higher annual dummy 
variables and inflating the indexes.  This occurs in the 19th Century European (excluding bought-
ins), Impressionist & Modern (including bought-ins), and Old Masters (excluding bought-ins) 
markets.  
Because the stock market performance variable is statistically insignificant in these markets, its 
positive or negative effect on prices (and thereby positive or negative effect on index returns) can be 




performance control variable and art prices negates the point of “significant variable” test, which is 
to control for some clear, underlying component of art demand. This invalidates test results for Old 
Masters, 19th Century European, and Impressionist & Modern markets. The discrepancy between 
theory and results in these markets may be due to the measure of “stock market performance” that 
the paper uses: The Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index is only constructed using 
US stocks. I assumed that this would effectively proxy for global stock performance, but using 
another variable that also accounts for European and Asian stock performance might help better 
control for demand in Old Masters, 19th Century European, and Impressionist & Modern markets. 
The only two genre-based markets for which the stock performance control variable is 
statistically significant (American and PW&C), have bolded numbers in Table 6. As expected, in 
both of these markets higher stock prices are correlated with higher prices for art. Controlling for 
stock market performance thereby deflates these indexes. This is most apparent for the American art 
index, in which controlling for stock market performance completely deflates art index performance 
(see Figure 16). Controlling for stock performance also deflates the PW&C index, but leaves annual 
dummy variables on the years 2005 through 2018 statistically significant at a 95% confidence level 
before accounting for bought-ins, and dummy variables for 2006-2013 statistically significant after 
accounting for bought-ins. At a 99% confidence level, 2007-2012 are statistically significant before 
accounting for bought-ins, and 2008, 2009, and 2012 are statistically significant after controlling for 
bought-ins. Bought-ins thereby have a more important effect on the “significant year” test results 







C. Robustness checks 
i. Repricing Bought-Ins 
This paper prices bought-ins at a default of 50% of their low estimate. However, this is just 
an estimate of their true market price (see 2D).  Repricing bought-ins at 25%, 75%, or 100% instead 
of 50% has a very minimal effect on the aggregate art market index, which is consistently lower than 
the aggregate market index that excludes bought-ins (figure 20). The general effect of bought-ins is 
shown in figure 21: regardless of how bought-ins are priced, an aggregate index of all bought-ins 
significantly underperforms an aggregate index that excludes bought-ins.  
Pricing bought-ins differently has a consistent effect on SADF t-stats. In markets where 
including bought-ins originally had a positive effect on SADF t-stats (19th Century European, 
Impressionist & Modern, and Old Masters), pricing bought-ins higher results in lower SADF t-stats. 
In markets where including bought-ins originally had a negative effect on SADF t-stats (PW&C and 
American), pricing bought-ins higher results in higher SADF t-stats. This may be because data 
points for bought-in prices hold more power in the OLS regressions used to generate each index if 
they are lower (and are thereby bigger negative outliers). So in markets where SADF t-stats are 
negatively impacted by bought-ins, pricing them higher and thereby decreasing the power of bought-
in data points in the OLS regressions used to create market indexes, leads to higher SADF t-stats – 
and vice versa in markets where SADF t-stats are negatively impacted by bought-ins. Overall, 
repricing bought-ins does not change the statistical significance of any SADF t-stats, except in the 
PW&C index, where pricing bought-ins at 25% of each bought-in painting’s low estimate makes the 
SADF statistic no longer significant at a 99% confidence level. However, pricing bought-ins at 25% 




flippers were wildly overestimating the resell value of their paintings and setting very high reserve 
estimates.  
ii. Defining Genres Differently 
This paper uses an auction “sale-title” based approach to classify the genres of its paintings. 
However, some auction house sales classify paintings under genres that do not correspond with the 
year they were painted. For example, some paintings in the “19th Century European” were painted 
after 1900. This is likely because they follow a “19th Century European” style. As a robustness check, 
this the paper tests what happens if paintings were reclassified into genres based on the year painted. 
All paintings before 1800 are reclassified as “Old Masters,” all paintings originally classified as “19 th 
Century European” and painted after 1900 are classified as “Impressionist & Modern,” and all 
paintings painted after 1945 are reclassified as “PW&C.” Reclassifying genres does not have a 
statistically significant effect on any SADF t-stats, and the general effect of including bought-ins on 
SADF t-stats does not change. 
iii. Excluding Paintings with Adjusted “Hammer Prices” 
Roughly 30% of paintings in the sample had prices listed as the “hammer price” for which 
they were bought at auction. The remaining paintings were priced at “premium prices” – their 
hammer prices plus some auction premium. To derive a “premium price” for all paintings, I reprice 
the paintings with “hammer prices,” using estimated auction fees (see 24A). McAndrew et al. (2012) 
and Spaenjers et al. (2015) convert hammer prices to premium prices in a similar fashion. To test 
whether this “repricing” leads to biased results, I rerun all SADF tests using indexes built only using 
paintings originally priced at their “premium price” – i.e., excluding all paintings I had to “reprice.” 




significance of PW&C SADF t-stats from a >99% confidence level to a >95% confidence level, but 
the effect of pricing bought-ins on SADF t-stats remains the same. 
iv. Trimester-based indexes  
Because not all paintings are sold at the same day in each year, the data pools across different 12-
month periods. For example, if some paintings are sold in January one year and others are sold in 
February the next year, the index accidentally includes an “extra” month of growth for that year. 
Geltner (1993) calls this the “working effect” and shows that in theory this should result in an 
estimated index with returns that are too smooth (i.e., the estimate SD > population SD), as well as 
positive serial correlation between years that leads to misplaced index peaks and valleys. Estimating 
the index with multiple time-based dummy variables a year – e.g., three trimesters – and using only 
one of these dummy variables a year – e.g., the first trimester every year – to estimate an index 
should help resolve this. However, Appendix table 22A and 23A shows no evidence for the 
“working effect” problem, because returns exhibit no positive serial correlations between years. It 
also shows that estimating the index using multiple time-series dummy variables a year does not 
significantly change serial correlation or the standard deviation of returns. Just to be thorough, I 
rerun all of the SADF tests using a trimester-based index. This has mixed effects and reduces the 
significance of PW&C SADF t-stats from a >99% confidence level to a >95% confidence level. 
Otherwise this test does not affect the statistical significance of t-stats but does diminish the 
negative effect of including bought-ins on SADF t-stats. There is no theoretical account that 








In this paper, I use both a SADF test and a “significant year” test to examine speculative 
bubbles in the 19th Century European, American, Post-War & Contemporary, Impressionist & 
Modern, and Old Masters art markets. Both tests find strong and consistent evidence for a bubble in 
the Post-War & Contemporary market before 2009. The “significant year” test – a novel 
contribution to art market literature that controls for demand to identify art market bubbles – 
indicates that this bubble may have persisted for several years. Overall, test results contrast with 
Kräussl et al. (2016), who find evidence for several bubbles in 2014 in the markets that this paper 
tests. The difference is likely because this paper employs more robust controls for artists and auction 
houses to create its indexes. 
Kräussl et al. and other attempts to test for bubbles in the art market have employed SADF tests 
on price indexes of purchased art, but theoretical models of buyer behavior in the art market suggest 
that such tests might be biased, because failing to account for unsold art could bias indexes. This 
paper evaluates whether this is the case.  As might be expected, the effect of bought-ins varies 
according to the nature of the market. In lower performing markets, accounting for bought-ins has 
an inconsistent effect on index returns and bubble-test results. At the same time, the exclusion of 
bought-in art from empirical estimation leads to a marked bias in higher performing markets, which 
exhibit lower returns and weaker test-based evidence for bubbles after accounting for bought-ins. 
This bias might be even greater than the paper estimates, because I price bought-ins at a constant 
multiple of their low estimate.  This may lead to an underestimation of negative deviations in the 
market prices of bought-ins.  Future papers should continue evaluating the best way to price 
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Summary statistics for painting sales in each art genre the paper tests. Unclassified paintings are sampled paintings that 





Summary statistics for returns on each genre-based market’s index before and after accounting for bought-ins. Here, 
“Aggregate” is an index based on a hedonic regression with data from all five genres. The “Aggregate” index does not 





Total 19th Century 
European 







# of Painting Sales 50,842 9,378 8,609 11,541 11,070 9,650 595 
# of Sold Paintings 34,645 5,876 6,580 8,531 7,478 5,837 343 
# of Unsold Paintings 16,197 3,502 2,029 3,010 3,592 3,813 252 
Sale Rate 68% 63% 76% 74% 68% 60% 58% 
Unique Artists 14,517 3,499 2,259 3,190 2,299 3,434 523 
Mean Price $471,033 $92,228 $84,985 $894,346 $802,433 $234,401 $639,445 
Median Price $25,000 $21,850 $11,875 $33,350 $40,302 $36,270 $10,000 
5% Percentile Price $1,055 $1,230 $793 $831 $1,045 $2,868 $1,363 
95% Percentile Price $1,497,000 $375,325 $314,000 $3,274,500 $3,515,710 $855,000 $325,000 
Mean Year of Painting 1917 1873 1911 1976 1924 1695 1888 
% Dated 60% 52% 55% 91% 73% 21% 38% 
Average Height (Inches) 28 25 31 39 23 27 29 
Average Width (Inches) 29 27 24 40 24 28 28 
Average Size ( Sq 
Inches) 
1,189 863 1,029 2,266 648 973 895 
Unique Auction Houses 50 43 37 44 46 43 48 
%Signed 75% 89% 88% 84% 88% 27% 58% 
%Oil 81% 94% 89% 50% 88% 93% 68% 
%Canvas 66% 73% 69% 61% 71% 58% 53% 
% Hammer Price 34% 35% 19% 32% 43% 36% 53% 
%Untitled 4% 0% 1% 18% 1% 0% 7% 
 Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins 
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Aggregate 3.45% 17.68% -38.83% 43.81% 3.08% 17.57% -38.30% 41.23% 
19th Century European 1.62% 15.08% -23.02% 38.97% 1.38% 15.69% -27.29% 44.51% 
American 2.69% 33.28% -48.97% 73.39% 2.81% 33.86% -50.51% 67.13% 
Post-War & 
Contemporary 
7.78% 19.70% -47.66% 47.04% 6.95% 19.87% -45.20% 42.86% 
Impressionist & Modern 0.24% 29.70% -79.19% 50.36% 0.68% 26.20% -55.22% 49.94% 















Price indexes for “Post-War & Contemporary,” “19th Century European,” “Impressionist & Modern,” “Old Masters,” 
and “American” markets from 1995 to 2019 before including bought-ins in index creation. All series are annual data and 




















1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019
Year
Post-War & Contemporary Old Masters
19th Century European American
Impressionist & Modern
Art Market Indexes by Genre
 
Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Aggregate 0.37% 0.11% -0.53% 2.58% 
19th Century European 0.24% -0.61% 4.27% -5.54% 
American -0.12% -0.58% 1.54% 6.26% 
Post-War & Contemporary 0.83% -0.17% -2.46% 4.18% 
Impressionist & Modern -0.44% 3.50% -23.97% 0.42% 




SADF-Based Bubble Detection 
Table 3 
SADF Critical values for identifying the existence of a bubble episode (found in Philips et al., 2014), and critical values 
for dating the start and finish of an episode after the existence of a bubble has been established (found through 5000 








Shows SADF values by genre before and after including bought-ins. SADF values are the highest of the ADF scores 
across all years for each genre. Post-War & Contemporary SADF scores are statistically significant at a 99% confidence 

















   
                                     
 
Identifying 
Existence of Bubble 
Identifying Start 
and End Dates 
90% Level 0.86 -0.448 
95% Level 1.17 -0.092 
99% Level 1.77 0.602 
 
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins 
Aggregate -0.17 -0.29 
19th Century European -0.80 -0.60 
American -2.64 -2.95 
Post-War & Contemporary 2.17*** 1.95*** 
Impressionist & Modern -1.78 -1.35 





Shows SADF-test based bubbles, identified by genre at different confidence levels before and after including bought-ins. 




Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins  
1st Episode 2nd Episode 1st Episode 2nd Episode 
Aggregate - - - - 
19th Century European - - - - 
American - - - - 
Post-War & Contemporary 2004-2008 - 2004-2008 - 
Impressionist & Modern - - - - 




Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins  
1st Episode 2nd Episode 1st Episode 2nd Episode 
Aggregate - - - - 
19th Century European - - - - 
American - - - - 
Post-War & Contemporary 2004-2008 - 2004-2008 - 
Impressionist & Modern - - - - 




Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins  
1st Episode 2nd Episode 1st Episode 2nd Episode 
Aggregate - - - - 
19th Century European - - - - 
American - - - - 
Post-War & Contemporary 2005-2008 - 2005-2008 - 
Impressionist & Modern - - - - 









Shows the aggregate market index, which is based on a hedonic regression with data from all five genres, before 
and after including bought-ins in index creation. Series are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995. 
 
Figure 3 
Shows the “Aggregate Index” ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-statistics are found 
using forward recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested 
against corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical 
















 Shows the 19th Century European art market index from 1995 to 2019 before and after including bought-ins in index 
creation. Series are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995 
 
Figure 5 
Shows the 19th Century European ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-statistics are found 
using forward recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested 
against corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical 
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Year
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins





Shows the American art market index from 1995 to 2019 before and after including bought-ins in index creation. Series 
are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995 
 
Figure 7: 
Shows the American ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-statistics are found using forward 
recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested against 
corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical values 
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Year
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins





Shows the Post-War & Contemporary art market index from 1995 to 2019 before and after including bought-ins in 
index creation. Series are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995 
 
Figure 9 
Shows the PW&C ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-statistics are found using forward 
recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested against 
corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical values 


















1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019
Year
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins





Shows the Impressionist & Modern art market index from 1995 to 2019 before and after including bought-ins in index 
creation. Series are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995 
 
Figure 11 
Shows the Impressionist & Modern ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-stats are found 
using forward recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested 
against corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical 
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Shows the Old Masters art market index from 1995 to 2019 before and after including bought-ins in index creation. 
Series are annual data and normalized to 100 in 1995 
 
Figure 13 
Shows the Old Masters ADF t-statistic sequence before and after including bought-ins. T-stats are found using forward 
recursive calculations with an expanding window and initial window size of 10 years. T-stats are tested against 
corresponding critical values for bubble identification at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, which are the same critical values 
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“Significant Year” Bubble Detection 
Table 6 
 Bubbles identified by genre at different confidence levels using the “Significant Year” approach. Years with statistically 
significant annual dummy variables after controlling for hedonic characteristics of art and stock index performance are 
classified as bubble years.  NOTE: Genres that are not bold have a statistically insignificant relationship between the 
stock performance control variable and painting prices before and after including bought-ins (see Appendix tables 4 and 
5). This invalidates the purpose and results of the test for these genres (see paper section 4Aiii.). 
90% Confidence  
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins 
 
1st Episode 2nd Episode 3rd Episode 4th Episode 1st Episode 2nd 
Episode 
3rd Episode 
Aggregate 2001 2006-2010 2014 - 2006-2008 - - 
19th Euro* 1997-2019 - - - 2006-2009 - - 
American - - - - - - - 
PW & C 2003-2019 - - - 2005-2015 - - 
I&M* 2003 2005 - - 2001 2007-2008 2014 
OM* 1998 2000-2003 2005-2014 2017 2006-2007 - - 
 
95% Confidence  
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins 
 
1st Episode 2nd Episode 3rd Episode 4th Episode 1st Episode 2nd 
Episode 
3rd Episode 
Aggregate 2001 2006-2010 - - 2006-2008 - - 
19th Euro* 1997-2019 - - - 2006 - - 
American - - - - - - - 
PW&C 2005-2018 - - - 2006-2013 - - 
I&M* - - - - 2001 2007-2008 2014 
OM* 1998 2006-2010 2012-2013 - 2006-2007 - - 
 
99% Confidence  
Excluding Bought-Ins Including Bought-Ins  
1st Episode 2nd Episode 3rd Episode 4th Episode 1st Episode 2nd 
Episode 
3rd Episode 
Aggregate 2006-2008 - - - 2006-2007 - - 
19th Euro* 1997-2018 - - - - - - 
American - - - - - - - 
PW & C 2007-2012 - - - 2008-2009 2012 - 
I&M* - - - - - - - 









Shows the “original” Aggregate art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock performance or 
including bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995 (called “income” 
here), both before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients for the 
“bubble identification” test.  
 
Figure 15 
Shows the “original” 19th Century European art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock 
performance or including bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995, here 
called “income,” both before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients 







Shows the “original” American art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock performance or 
including bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995(called “income” 
here) both before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients for the 
“bubble identification.” These results are valid, but controlling for stock market performance deflates the American 
index and leaves no statistically significant coefficients.  
 
Figure 17 
Shows the “original” PW&C art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock performance or including 
bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995, here called “income,” both 
before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients for the “bubble 
identification” test. These results are valid, due to the statistically significant relationship between stock market 






Shows the “original” Impressionist & Modern art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock 
performance or including bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995, here 
called “income,” both before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients 
for the “bubble identification” test. No bubbles are identified at the 99% level, but “bubble identifications” in this 
market are invalid anyway (see note on Table 6 and paper section 4Aiii.). 
 
Figure 19 
Shows the “original” Old Masters art market index from 1995 to 2019 before controlling for stock performance or 
including bought-ins, and then the index after controlling for stock market performance since 1995, here called 
“income,” both before and after including bought-ins. Yellow dots correspond with 99% significant coefficients for the 







Pricing Bought-Ins Differently 
Figure 20 
Helps visualize the effect of pricing bought-ins differently on the Aggregate Art Index. Regardless of what fraction of 
the low estimate bought-ins are priced, including bought-ins deflates the aggregate art index.   
 
Figure 21 
Shows the difference between the aggregate index that excludes bought-ins, and an aggregate index of bought-ins only. 
Pricing bought-ins at different multiples of the low estimate does not change the performance of a bought-in only index. 







Shows SADF t-stats by genre before including bought-ins and then including bought-ins at different multiples of each 
painting’s low estimate. The default bought-in this paper is le*.5. Here, deviating away from le*5 does alter which genres 
have statistically significant SADF scores. Pricing bought-ins at .25 * le does reduce the confidence level of the PW&C’s 




Defining Genres Differently 
Table 8 
Shows SADF t-stats by genre using original genre classifications, and then alternate genre classifications (based on the 
year each painting was painted – see paper section 4Bii.) Alternate genre classifications do not change which genres have 









Excluding Bought-Ins le*.25 le*.5 le*75 le*100 
Aggregate -0.17 -0.31 -0.29 -0.29 -0.30 
19th Century European -0.80 -0.42 -0.60 -0.77 -0.91 
American -2.64 -3.04 -2.95 -2.88 -2.83 
Post-War & Contemporary 2.17*** 1.65** 1.95*** 2.11*** 2.21*** 
Impressionist & Modern -1.78 -1.16 -1.35 -1.47 -1.55 
















19th Century European -0.80 -0.60 -0.84 -0.78 
American -2.64 -2.95 -2.62 -2.87 
Post-War & Contemporary 2.17*** 1.95*** 2.29*** 1.78*** 
Impressionist & Modern -1.78 -1.35 -1.41 -1.30 





Excluding Paintings with Adjusted “Hammer Prices” 
Table 9 
Shows SADF t-stats by genre using original indexes, and then alternate indexes that are built only using paintings 
originally priced at their “premium price.” “Premium-based” indexes generally have lower SADF scores, but PW&C 




Shows SADF t-stats by genre using original “annual” indexes, and then “trimester” indexes, which estimate index 
changes using sales from only one trimester a year. This has mixed effects and reduces the significance of PW&C SADF 




















Aggregate -0.17 -0.29 -0.330 -0.332 
19th Century European -0.80 -0.60 -1.63 -1.13 
American -2.64 -2.95 -2.68 -2.94 
Post-War & Contemporary 2.17*** 1.95*** 1.57** 1.29** 
Impressionist & Modern -1.78 -1.35 -1.99 -1.68 














Aggregate -0.17 -0.29 -0.23 0.059 
19th Century European -0.80 -0.60 -0.16 -0.57 
American -2.64 -2.95 -2.16 -2.39 
Post-War & Contemporary 2.17*** 1.95*** 1.37** 1.38** 
Impressionist & Modern -1.78 -1.35 -1.89 -1.21 


































Regression Result References 
Table 1A 
Lists all hedonic regression variables and the motivation for using them. 
Variable Variable Definition 
i.Year Dummy variable for each year in the sample. Reference/base/omitted year is 1995, so that coefficients on 
each annual dummy variable shows changes in prices relative to 1995.  
i.Artist Dummy variable for each artist in the sample who has painting sales across more than one year. Intended to 
capture the heterogenous effect of the reputation of artists on the prices of their paintings. Artists with only 
one painting or multiple paintings in a single year are grouped as a single dummy variable to avoid perfect 
collinearity between annual dummy variables and dummy variables for these artists. Due to the high number 
of artists, coefficients for each artist are not included in the regression results in tables 2A-6A.   
i.Auctionhouse Dummy variable for each auction house in the sample. Intended to capture the heterogenous effect of the 
reputation of each auction house on the price of the paintings it sells. Auction houses with sales concentrated 
in a single year are grouped as a single dummy variable to avoid high collinearity between annual dummy 
variables and dummy variables for each auction house. Due to the high number of different auction houses, 
coefficients for each house are not included in the regression results in tables 2A-6A, but coefficients for each 
auction house in the "Original Aggregate" regression are listed in tables 18A, 19A, and 20A  
Signed Dummy variable for whether the painting is signed or not. Anderson (1974) explains that attribution to the 
painter can be a significant feature of the sales price, so one should expect a "signed" painting to sell for more. 
Stamped Dummy variable for whether the painting is stamped or not. Stamps are generally on the back of paintings 
were often placed by old suppliers of the paintings with the names and addresses of their businesses. It is 
unclear whether "stamped" paintings should sell for more. 
Inscribed Dummy variable for whether the painting is inscribed or not. Inscriptions are usually on the back of the 
painting, and are often the inscribed initials of previous owners of the paintings or old handwritten notes 
about the painting.  It is unclear whether "inscribed" paintings should sell for more. 
Size (inches) Continuous variable that measures the size of paintings (height x width). At first, bigger paintings are expected 
to sell for more because all else equal a larger painting requires more work on the part of the artist. However, 
owning a huge painting might be impratical, and thereby after painting sizes are too big to fit in ordinary 
interior spaces, demand might diminish for paintings. If this were true, there would be a quadratic relationship 
between prices and painting size and this variable would be positive. 
Size Squared Continuous variable that measures the squared size of paintings (height x width). If the presumed quadratic 
relationship between painting size and painting prices exists, this size-squared should have a negative 
relationship with price.  
Other Medium Dummy variable for "other" types of paint. Oil paintings are the omitted/reference group. "Other medium" 
encompasses unconventional types of "paint." For example, one painting in the database was done using 
"chewing gum on canvas." Chewing gum is classified as a type of "other medium." Given the unusual nature 
of "other" types of paint, it is unclear how this dummy variable should affect prices. 
Pastel Dummy variable for pastel paints. Oil painting are the omitted/reference group. Generally of all painting 
mediums, oil has the highest sales price (Kräussl et al., 2016), so I expect this coefficient to be negative. 
However, pastel paints produce similar colors to oil paints and should have a more positive effect on painting 
prices than other non-oil paints. 
Graphite/ Chalk Dummy variable for whether graphite/chalk is used as paint. Oil paintings are the omitted/reference group. 
Generally of all painting mediums, oil has the highest sales price (Kräussl et al., 2016), so I expect this 
coefficient to be negative. Graphite/chalk is generally used to draw, not paint, and it produces pictures that 
are less rich in color than oil or other paints. Graphite/Chalk should thereby have a more negative effect on 
prices than other non-oil paints. 
Fresco Dummy variable for whether a painting is a fresco. Oil paintings are the omitted/reference group. Generally 
of all painting mediums, oil has the highest sales price (Kräussl et al., 2016), but the fresco technique to 
painting is now uncommon, and buyers might value the novelty that comes with buying an older "fresco" 
painting, the effect of fresco's on prices relative to oil paintings is unclear. 
Watercolor Dummy variable for watercolor paints. Oil paintings are the omitted/reference group. Generally of all 
painting mediums, oil has the highest sales price (Kräussl et al., 2016), so I expect this coefficient to be 
negative. Unlike pastels, watercolor paints are very distinct from oil paints are often regarded as inferior. I 
thereby expect watercolors to have more of a negative effect on prices than pastels but less than 
graphite/chalk. 
Acrylic Dummy variable for acrylic paints. Oil paintings are the omitted/reference group. Generally of all painting 
mediums, oil has the highest sales price (Kräussl et al., 2016), so I expect this coefficient to be negative. 
Acrylic paints are bright,  very distinct from oil paints, and more commonly used in the present than in the 




Other Material Dummy variable for when a painting is painted on "other" types of material. Canvas is the omitted/reference 
group for material. "Other material" encompasses unconventional materials used to paint on, for example, 
"colorized salt." Given the unusual nature of most "other" materials, it is unclear how this dummy variable 
should affect prices. 
Panel Dummy variable for when a painting is painted on a panel. Canvas is the omitted/reference group for 
material. Many Old Masters painted on panels, but canvas is more popular today. This suggests that panels 
might have a positive impact on prices in the Old Masters genre because its connote authenticity, but less of 
an impact in more recent genres. 
Paper/ 
Cardboard 
Dummy variable for when a painting is painted on paper or cardboard. Canvas is the omitted/reference 
group. Paper and cardboard are much cheaper than canvas, so I expect this coefficient to be negative. 
Metal Dummy variable for when a painting is painted on metal. Canvas is the omitted/reference group. Metal 
generally is more expensive than canvas, so I expect this coefficient to be positive. 
In the manner of Dummy variable for whether a painting is "in the manner of" the artist listed as opposed to actually painted by 
the artist. I expect this coefficient to be negative, because if an artist is having paintings done in their manner, 
they are likely influence/ well-known, and buyers would prefer paintings from a well-known artist over 
paintings from someone imitating the well-known artist  
Circle/Follower Dummy variable for whether a work is painted by someone in the circle of or directly following the artist 
listed, as opposed to actually painted by the artist. I expect this coefficient to be negative, because buyers 
would prefer paintings from the original well-known artist themselves, but I expect this coefficient to be less 
negative than the "in the manner" coefficient, because the label "in the circle of / follower of" implies that 
there was contact/proximity between the painting's actual artist and the well-known artist that is listed. 
Attributed to Dummy variable for whether a work is "attributed" to the artist listed, as opposed to certainly painted by the 
artist listed. I expect this coefficient to be negative, because buyers prefer painting that are unambiguously 
attributed to the artist listed (Anderson, 1974)  
“Untitled” Dummy variable for whether a work is titled "untitled" (or translations of "untitled"). I expect this coefficient 
to be negative, because "untitled" is generic, and signals less care was put into characterizing the content of a 
work.  
“Composition” Dummy variable for whether a work is titled "composition" (or translations of "composition"). I expect this 
coefficient to be negative, because "composition" is generic, and signals less care was put into characterizing 
the content of a work.  
Title Length Continuous variable that measures the number of letters in the title of a painting. Longer painting titles could 
suggest that more effort has been put into characterizing the content in a work. Shorter titles may also be 
more likely to be generic. For example, all else equal, buyers might perceive a painting titled "Landscape" less 
favorably than a painting titled "An Italian landscape with a traveler on a path by a waterfall" (this is the title 
of a painting in the paper's sample). 
ln(stock market 
index) 
Continuous variable used for the "significant year" tests. Proxies for appreciation of the wealth of the wealthy 
since 1995, and is then used to control for changes in art demand due to changes in income since 1995. It is 
the natural log of an index of all returns (including dividends) on all stocks in the CRSP database of American 
















Shows hedonic regression results done on data that excludes bought-ins. Exponentiated coefficients on the annual 
dummy variables correspond to the genre-based indexes in Figure 2. Controls for all artists and auction houses are 
included in this regression but are not listed due to the high number of dummy artist and auction house variables.  
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW &C I&M OM 
1996 -0.05 -0.02 -0.12 -0.04 -0.17 0.11 
1997 0.15*** 0.23** 0.53*** 0.00 -0.19 0.03 
1998 0.25*** 0.44*** 0.50*** -0.05 -0.25** 0.73*** 
1999 0.13** 0.38*** 0.20* 0.09 -0.29** 0.16 
2000 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.57*** 0.45*** 0.11 0.58*** 
2001 0.55*** 0.42*** 0.59*** 0.60*** 0.48*** 0.60*** 
2002 0.28*** 0.32** 0.21** 0.67*** -0.31** 0.50*** 
2003 0.31*** 0.33** 0.39*** 0.66*** -0.18 0.37 
2004 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.26** 0.93*** -0.12 0.05 
2005 0.46*** 0.42*** 0.21** 1.15*** -0.32*** 0.67*** 
2006 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 1.35*** 0.18 1.15*** 
2007 1.04*** 0.80*** 0.32*** 1.82*** 0.66*** 1.45*** 
2008 0.95*** 0.81*** 0.30*** 1.84*** 0.48*** 1.25*** 
2009 0.56*** 0.63*** -0.14 1.36*** 0.18 0.54*** 
2010 0.71*** 0.56*** 0.15 1.60*** 0.07 0.98*** 
2011 0.74*** 0.83*** 0.24 1.67*** 0.18 0.70*** 
2012 0.87*** 0.81*** 0.29* 1.92*** 0.17 0.89*** 
2013 0.76*** 0.67*** 0.24 1.86*** 0.19 0.87*** 
2014 0.90*** 0.70*** 0.52*** 1.85*** 0.60 0.92*** 
2015 0.81*** 0.47*** 0.14*** 2.10*** 0.30** 0.56*** 
2016 0.93*** 0.57*** 0.87*** 1.91*** 0.33*** 0.63*** 
2017 0.99*** 0.62*** 0.77*** 1.93*** 0.48*** 0.94*** 
2018 0.94*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 2.00*** 0.19 1.10*** 
2019 0.83*** 0.39*** 0.65*** 1.87*** 0.06 0.78*** 
Signed -0.06*** 0.31*** 0.13*** 0.07* 0.29*** 0.12*** 
Stamped -0.34*** 0.00 -0.26 -0.18* 0.03 -0.58** 
Inscribed -0.04* 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 
Size (inches) .000034*** .00016*** .000046*** .00013*** .00044*** 0.00042*** 
Size Squared -1.04e-11 *** -6.40e-10*** -1.41e-11*** -1.39e-10*** -2.13e-08*** -2.74e-08*** 
Other Medium -0.18*** -0.23 -0.14 -0.26*** -0.42*** 0.44*** 
Pastel 0.05 -0.48** 0.01 -0.59*** 0.35* -0.23 
Graphite/Chalk -0.79*** -0.63** -1.64*** -0.35** -1.22*** -0.53* 
Fresco 0.49 (omitted) (omitted) 0.19 -0.01 -0.05 
Watercolor -0.34*** -0.26* -0.36*** -0.43*** -0.54*** -0.96*** 
Acrylic 0.06 (omitted) -0.11 0.06 0.04 (omitted) 
Other Material -0.45*** -0.15 -0.05 -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.32** 
Panel -0.19*** -0.27*** -0.32*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 0.28*** 
Paper/Cardboard -0.81*** -0.57*** -0.73*** -0.79*** -0.38*** -0.15 
Metal 0.12 -0.20 0.52 0.09 5.95*** 0.31*** 
In the manner of -1.38*** -0.79** -0.32 (omitted) -1.23 -1.47*** 
Circle/Follower -1.12*** -0.86*** -1.14* 0.33 -1.57 -1.29*** 
Attributed to -0.38*** 0.23 0.24 2.82*** -0.64 -0.68*** 
“Untitled” -0.35*** 0.32 -0.08 -0.28*** -0.37 (omitted) 
“Composition” -0.34*** 0.99 -.06 -0.38*** -0.05 0.43 
Title Length 0.01*** 0.004*** .004*** 0.001 0.002* 0.004*** 
Constant 10.37*** 9.73*** 9.19*** 10.09*** 10.80*** 10.10*** 
Observations 34,302 5,876 6,580 8,531 7,478 5,837 





Shows hedonic regression results done on data that includes bought-ins. Exponentiated coefficients on the annual 
dummy variables correspond to the bought-in inclusive genre-based indexes in Figure 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12. Controls for 
all artists and auction houses are included in this regression but are not listed due to the high number of dummy artist 
and auction house variables.  
***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW &C I&M OM 
1996 0.04 0.04 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.04 
1997 0.10** 0.15* 0.59*** -0.10 -0.21** 0.00 
1998 0.18*** 0.36*** 0.55*** -0.12 -0.25*** 0.55*** 
1999 0.03 0.25*** 0.10 -0.04 -0.35*** 0.01 
2000 0.40*** 0.34*** 0.51*** 0.39*** 0.15 0.32*** 
2001 0.50*** 0.37*** 0.62*** 0.48*** 0.47*** 0.36*** 
2002 0.24*** 0.16* 0.13 0.49*** -0.08 0.33*** 
2003 0.28*** 0.21** 0.34*** 0.62*** -0.10 0.26*** 
2004 0.29*** 0.18** 0.24** 0.82*** -0.16 -0.01 
2005 0.43*** 0.33*** 0.23*** 1.03*** -0.22** 0.58*** 
2006 0.84*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 1.25*** 0.25** 1.04*** 
2007 0.94*** 0.74*** 0.27*** 1.65*** 0.62*** 1.22*** 
2008 0.86*** 0.66*** 0.27*** 1.72*** 0.48*** 0.88*** 
2009 0.47*** 0.52*** -0.16 1.27*** 0.12 0.38*** 
2010 0.60*** 0.42*** 0.09 1.44*** 0.04 0.70*** 
2011 0.69*** 0.66*** 0.20** 1.60*** 0.24*** 0.58*** 
2012 0.77*** 0.69*** 0.23** 1.73*** 0.15 0.72*** 
2013 0.67*** 0.55*** 0.17* 1.72*** 0.20** 0.67*** 
2014 0.84*** 0.63*** 0.53*** 1.72*** 0.63*** 0.69*** 
2015 0.71*** 0.35*** 0.14 1.90*** 0.34*** 0.42*** 
2016 0.77*** 0.45*** 0.78*** 1.65*** 0.36*** 0.34*** 
2017 0.84*** 0.48*** 0.79*** 1.74*** 0.41*** 0.54*** 
2018 0.88*** 0.45*** 0.68*** 1.95*** 0.26*** 0.80*** 
2019 0.74*** 0.33*** 0.67*** 1.67*** 0.16 0.63*** 
Signed -0.07*** 0.25*** 0.18*** 0.08** 0.21*** 0.10*** 
Stamped -0.35*** -0.10 -0.24 -0.11 -0.10 -0.34* 
Inscribed -0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.07 
Size (inches) .000042*** .00021*** .000049*** .00012*** .00047*** .00029*** 
Size Squared -1.32e-11*** --8.37e-10*** -1.50e-11*** -1.32e-10*** -2.32e-08*** -7.88e-09*** 
Other Medium -0.21*** -0.02 -0.14 -0.31*** -0.37*** 0.44*** 
Pastel -0.04 -0.40** -0.11 -0.61*** 0.10 0.01 
Graphite/Chalk -0.81*** -0.63*** -1.37*** -0.60*** -1.21*** -0.63** 
Fresco 0.53 (omitted) (omitted) 0.38 0.35 0.30 
Watercolor -0.33*** -0.05* -0.33*** -0.49*** -0.46*** -1.07*** 
Acrylic 0.04 (omitted) -0.02 0.09** -0.27 -2.30 
Other Material -0.45*** -0.31 -0.10 -0.29*** -0.40*** -0.48*** 
Panel -0.16*** -0.26*** -0.26*** -0.20*** -0.15*** 0.23*** 
Paper/Cardboard -0.75*** -0.51*** -0.73*** -0.73*** -0.36*** -0.16 
Metal 0.09 -0.10 -0.11 0.11 6.19*** 0.25*** 
In the manner of -1.46*** -1.02** 0.05 (omitted) -2.43*** -1.62*** 
Circle/Follower -1.15*** -0.89*** -0.87 0.84 -0.90* -1.33*** 
Attributed to -0.40*** -0.11 0.18 1.18 -0.33 -0.72*** 
“Untitled” -0.34*** 0.92 -0.09 -0.28*** -0.08 -1.56 
“Composition” -0.30*** -0.07 0.01 -0.25*** 0.00 0.15 
Title Length 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.0045*** .0028** 0.00*** .0038*** 
Constant 10.10*** 9.44*** 8.92*** 9.92*** 10.43*** 10.03*** 
Observations 50,055 9,348 8,606 11,497 11,022 9,582 





Table 4A  
Shows hedonic regression results after controlling for stock market returns on data that excludes bought-ins. These are 
the results used for the “significant coefficient” test. The statistically insignificant relationship between ln(stock market 
index) and prices in the 19th Euro, I&M and OM markets suggests that the “significant coefficient” test is invalid for 
these genres (see 2Bii.). Hedonic controls not listed. 












Aggregate 19th Euro American PW &C I&M OM 
1996 -0.13 0.12 -0.57 -0.16 -0.23 0.14 
1997 -0.01 0.48*** -0.33 -0.26 -0.30 0.08 
1998 0.01 0.82*** -0.77 -0.41 -0.43 0.80*** 
1999 -0.15 0.84*** -1.30 -0.34 -0.51 0.25 
2000 0.14 1.00*** -1.17 -0.04 -0.13 0.69* 
2001 0.26** 0.87*** -0.87 0.17 0.27 0.69** 
2002 0.04 0.70*** -1.01 0.30 -0.48 0.58* 
2003 0.10 0.66*** -0.72 0.33* -0.33* 0.43* 
2004 0.10 0.73*** -1.26 0.50* -0.33 0.14 
2005 0.14 0.90*** -1.45 0.67** -0.56* 0.77** 
2006 0.54*** 1.38*** -1.05 0.82** -0.09 1.26*** 
2007 0.63*** 1.43*** -1.80 1.21*** 0.35 1.57*** 
2008 0.56*** 1.39*** -1.73 1.25*** 0.19 1.37*** 
2009 0.31*** 1.04*** -1.42 0.97*** -0.01 0.61** 
2010 0.35** 1.11*** -1.73 1.08*** -0.19 1.08*** 
2011 0.33 1.47*** -1.97 1.05*** -0.14 0.83** 
2012 0.45 1.46*** -1.96 1.30*** -0.15 1.02** 
2013 0.28 1.42*** -2.23 1.15*** -0.18 1.01** 
2014 0.37* 1.54*** -2.29 1.05** 0.19 1.07* 
2015 0.25 1.35*** -2.79 1.26** -0.13 0.72 
2016 0.37 1.43*** -2.07 1.09** -0.10 0.79 
2017 0.37 1.58*** -2.46 1.02*** 0.00 1.12* 
2018 0.28 1.53*** -2.78 1.04*** -0.31 1.29 
2019 0.16 1.43** -2.83 0.88* -0.46 0.98 
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ln(stock market index) 0.32*** -0.49 1.64*** 0.46*** 0.25 -.092 
Observations 34,302 9,348 5,876 8,531 7,478 5,837 





Shows hedonic regression results after controlling for stock market returns (ln(Stock Market Index)) on data that 
excludes bought-ins. These are the results used for the “significant coefficient” test. The statistically insignificant 
relationship between ln(stock market index) and prices in the 19th Euro, I&M and OM markets suggests that the 
“significant coefficient” test is invalid for these genres (see 2Bii.). Hedonic controls not listed. 













Aggregate 19th Euro American PW &C I&M OM 
1996 -0.08 -0.03 -0.57 -0.17 -0.02 -0.05 
1997 -0.12 0.03 -0.34 -0.45 -0.17 -0.17 
1998 -0.14 0.17 -0.84 -0.60 -0.18 0.31 
1999 -0.37 0.01 -1.52 -0.61 -0.25 -0.30 
2000 -0.05 0.06 -1.39 -0.27 0.26 -0.04 
2001 0.11 0.14 -0.97 -0.09 0.57*** 0.05 
2002 -0.09 -0.04 -1.19 0.00 0.00 0.05 
2003 -0.01 0.04 -0.87 0.19 -0.04 0.04 
2004 -0.11 -0.05 -1.41 0.24 -0.06 -0.33 
2005 0.00 0.08 -1.57 0.39* -0.12 0.23 
2006 0.35*** 0.48** -1.25 0.54** 0.37 0.64** 
2007 0.38*** 0.41* -2.05 0.83** 0.76** 0.78** 
2008 0.32** 0.36* -1.94 0.93*** 0.61** 0.45 
2009 0.12 0.31** -1.55 0.74*** 0.21 0.10 
2010 0.12 0.13 -1.97 0.74*** 0.16 0.33 
2011 0.12 0.33 -2.21 0.77** 0.38 0.14 
2012 0.19 0.35 -2.22 0.90*** 0.29 0.27 
2013 0.01 0.16 -2.52 0.77** 0.36 0.17 
2014 0.10 0.19 -2.54 0.66* 0.81** 0.13 
2015 -0.07 -0.10 -3.06 0.78* 0.53 -0.17 
2016 0.01 0.00 -2.42 0.55 0.55 -0.24 
2017 -0.01 -0.03 -2.72 0.52 0.63 -0.11 
2018 -0.02 -0.07 -3.02 0.65 0.49 0.11 
2019 -0.18 -0.22 -3.12 0.34 0.40 -0.07 
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ln(stock market 
index) 
0.438*** 0.256 1.786*** 0.62** -0.11 0.329*** 
Observations 50,055 9,348 8,606 11,497 11,022 9,582 





Shows hedonic regression results for the “Aggregate Index” done on data that either excludes bought-ins or prices them 
at different multiples of each painting’s low estimate. Exponentiated coefficients on the annual dummy variables 
correspond to indexes in figure 20. Hedonic controls are included in each of these regressions.  





























BI = .25 * LE BI = .5 * LE BI = .75 * LE BI = LE 
1996 -0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 
1997 0.15*** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 0.10** 
1998 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 
1999 0.13** -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07* 
2000 0.47*** 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
2001 0.55*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 
2002 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
2003 0.31*** 0.25*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 
2004 0.39*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
2005 0.46*** 0.45*** 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.41*** 
2006 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 
2007 1.04*** 0.97*** 0.94*** 0.93*** 0.92*** 
2008 0.95*** 0.84*** 0.86*** 0.87*** 0.88*** 
2009 0.56*** 0.46*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 
2010 0.71*** 0.57*** 0.60*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 
2011 0.74*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.69*** 0.70*** 
2012 0.87*** 0.75*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.79*** 
2013 0.76*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 
2014 0.90*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 
2015 0.81*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.73*** 
2016 0.93*** 0.73*** 0.77*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 
2017 0.99*** 0.83*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
2018 0.94*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
2019 0.83*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 
Hedonic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34,302 50,055 50,055 50,055 50,055 




ADF Result References 
Table 7A  
For indexes excluding bought-ins: ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions that begins with a 
window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, which corresponds to the SADF 














For indexes including bought-ins (priced at .5 *LE): ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions 
that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, which 














Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.631 -1.930 -2.642 0.439 -2.559 -2.650 
2005 -1.608 -1.962 -2.739 0.842 -2.596 -3.178 
2006 -0.536 -0.797 -2.636 1.081 -3.011 -1.921 
2007 -0.170 -0.961 -3.465 2.171 -1.781 -1.024 
2008 -0.699 -1.051 -3.614 1.008 -1.808 -1.357 
2009 -1.542 -1.660 -3.160 -0.704 -2.159 -2.066 
2010 -1.512 -1.848 -3.392 -0.535 -2.277 -2.072 
2011 -1.537 -1.480 -3.520 -0.574 -2.327 -2.290 
2012 -1.440 -1.616 -3.646 -0.348 -2.396 -2.311 
2013 -1.652 -1.945 -3.756 -0.614 -2.446 -2.388 
2014 -1.533 -1.979 -3.831 -0.770 -2.138 -2.425 
2015 -1.719 -2.221 -4.138 -0.545 -2.473 -2.613 
2016 -1.619 -2.279 -4.110 -0.949 -2.483 -2.687 
2017 -1.576 -2.316 -3.779 -1.033 -2.374 -2.705 
2018 -1.706 -2.430 -3.839 -1.042 -2.631 -2.636 
2019 -1.890 -2.439 -3.781 -1.286 -2.709 -2.872 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.890 -2.162 -2.954 0.312 -1.980 -3.201 
2005 -1.743 -2.229 -3.112 0.710 -2.030 -3.695 
2006 -0.534 -0.598 -2.954 1.042 -2.273 -1.525 
2007 -0.291 -0.844 -3.738 1.949 -1.350 -0.806 
2008 -0.766 -1.215 -3.888 1.166 -1.513 -1.474 
2009 -1.579 -1.612 -3.409 -0.599 -1.976 -1.946 
2010 -1.573 -1.812 -3.495 -0.489 -2.073 -1.980 
2011 -1.540 -1.616 -3.620 -0.385 -2.115 -2.117 
2012 -1.484 -1.601 -3.735 -0.332 -2.223 -2.123 
2013 -1.681 -1.910 -3.818 -0.506 -2.269 -2.207 
2014 -1.516 -1.877 -3.932 -0.637 -1.917 -2.258 
2015 -1.768 -2.190 -4.277 -0.501 -2.307 -2.419 
2016 -1.746 -2.260 -4.267 -0.979 -2.313 -2.463 
2017 -1.708 -2.315 -3.762 -0.973 -2.286 -2.554 
2018 -1.677 -2.387 -3.700 -0.807 -2.432 -2.513 





For indexes including bought-ins (priced at .25 *LE): ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF 
regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, 















For indexes including bought-ins (priced at .75 *LE): ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF 
regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, 














Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.933 -2.492 -3.038 0.206 -1.915 -3.300 
2005 -1.706 -2.562 -3.220 0.531 -2.010 -3.756 
2006 -0.391 -0.420 -3.039 0.908 -2.096 -1.280 
2007 -0.311 -0.893 -3.843 1.648 -1.164 -0.742 
2008 -0.860 -1.404 -3.994 0.970 -1.451 -1.529 
2009 -1.559 -1.649 -3.419 -0.573 -1.874 -1.888 
2010 -1.575 -1.814 -3.461 -0.473 -1.983 -1.957 
2011 -1.534 -1.742 -3.594 -0.401 -2.037 -2.067 
2012 -1.501 -1.679 -3.710 -0.366 -2.162 -2.099 
2013 -1.700 -1.955 -3.765 -0.565 -2.207 -2.178 
2014 -1.534 -1.893 -3.946 -0.650 -1.859 -2.233 
2015 -1.787 -2.219 -4.241 -0.517 -2.263 -2.367 
2016 -1.792 -2.297 -4.263 -1.015 -2.289 -2.397 
2017 -1.725 -2.346 -3.775 -0.948 -2.264 -2.504 
2018 -1.667 -2.419 -3.706 -0.737 -2.409 -2.485 
2019 -1.915 -2.479 -3.619 -1.224 -2.496 -2.589 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.876 -2.115 -2.884 0.365 -2.014 -3.198 
2005 -1.775 -2.189 -3.031 0.814 -2.029 -3.692 
2006 -0.634 -0.774 -2.893 1.108 -2.360 -1.742 
2007 -0.291 -0.860 -3.657 2.114 -1.465 -0.905 
2008 -0.709 -1.099 -3.807 1.273 -1.554 -1.463 
2009 -1.594 -1.625 -3.393 -0.619 -2.038 -2.007 
2010 -1.574 -1.850 -3.508 -0.504 -2.129 -2.018 
2011 -1.550 -1.556 -3.628 -0.380 -2.169 -2.174 
2012 -1.478 -1.595 -3.743 -0.317 -2.268 -2.162 
2013 -1.671 -1.919 -3.842 -0.473 -2.314 -2.250 
2014 -1.511 -1.919 -3.909 -0.633 -1.963 -2.298 
2015 -1.761 -2.213 -4.286 -0.495 -2.341 -2.471 
2016 -1.720 -2.280 -4.258 -0.957 -2.334 -2.526 
2017 -1.705 -2.340 -3.757 -0.991 -2.307 -2.607 
2018 -1.691 -2.412 -3.701 -0.854 -2.453 -2.558 





For indexes including bought-ins (priced at 1.0 *LE): ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF 
regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, 






























Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.870 -2.143 -2.826 0.395 -2.035 -2.143 
2005 -1.801 -2.230 -2.966 0.883 -2.023 -2.230 
2006 -0.714 -0.938 -2.846 1.143 -2.412 -0.938 
2007 -0.298 -0.906 -3.591 2.215 -1.548 -0.906 
2008 -0.668 -1.020 -3.741 1.340 -1.585 -1.020 
2009 -1.608 -1.657 -3.378 -0.636 -2.083 -1.657 
2010 -1.575 -1.898 -3.513 -0.517 -2.170 -1.898 
2011 -1.559 -1.526 -3.630 -0.380 -2.211 -1.526 
2012 -1.476 -1.615 -3.743 -0.309 -2.304 -1.615 
2013 -1.665 -1.945 -3.853 -0.450 -2.351 -1.945 
2014 -1.511 -1.976 -3.884 -0.631 -2.001 -1.976 
2015 -1.758 -2.252 -4.286 -0.494 -2.368 -2.252 
2016 -1.703 -2.315 -4.245 -0.941 -2.353 -2.315 
2017 -1.705 -2.381 -3.754 -1.005 -2.327 -2.381 
2018 -1.704 -2.453 -3.704 -0.889 -2.471 -2.453 





For indexes of markets with alternate genre classifications excluding bought-ins: ADF t-stats for each year of the 
forward recursive ADF regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF 














For indexes of markets with alternate genre classifications including bought-ins: ADF t-stats for each year of the forward 
recursive ADF regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for 















19th Euro American PW & 
C 
I &M OM 
2004 -1.938 -2.622 -0.078 -2.349 -2.758 
2005 -1.997 -2.823 0.244 -2.508 -3.259 
2006 -0.841 -2.902 0.823 -2.434 -1.963 
2007 -0.970 -3.542 1.783 -1.408 -1.099 
2008 -0.990 -3.667 1.244 -1.766 -1.425 
2009 -1.673 -3.170 -0.605 -2.120 -2.086 
2010 -1.861 -3.419 -0.527 -2.213 -2.084 
2011 -1.521 -3.555 -0.439 -2.272 -2.293 
2012 -1.702 -3.664 -0.334 -2.368 -2.268 
2013 -1.968 -3.672 -0.478 -2.447 -2.406 
2014 -1.985 -3.816 -0.587 -2.187 -2.482 
2015 -2.245 -3.797 -0.480 -2.639 -2.613 
2016 -2.304 -4.053 -0.864 -2.509 -2.686 
2017 -2.351 -4.098 -0.929 -2.290 -2.660 
2018 -2.453 -4.223 -0.662 -2.733 -2.612 
2019 -2.464 -4.328 -1.107 -2.802 -2.862 
 
19th Euro American PW & 
C 
I &M OM 
2004 -1.079 -1.522 -2.212 0.014 -2.919 
2005 -1.519 -1.453 -2.165 -0.177 -3.211 
2006 -0.518 -0.164 -2.389 0.456 -3.255 
2007 -0.227 -0.719 -3.020 1.366 -2.238 
2008 -0.696 -1.387 -3.166 0.890 -1.894 
2009 -1.406 -1.234 -2.775 -0.661 -2.278 
2010 -1.405 -1.665 -2.926 -0.435 -2.444 
2011 -1.402 -1.318 -3.068 -0.485 -2.533 
2012 -1.264 -1.703 -3.178 -0.209 -2.592 
2013 -1.140 -1.873 -3.271 -0.331 -2.349 
2014 -1.303 -1.865 -3.407 -0.577 -2.166 
2015 -1.375 -2.127 -3.434 -0.319 -2.434 
2016 -1.206 -2.137 -3.575 -0.638 -2.447 
2017 -1.349 -2.154 -3.385 -0.884 -2.460 
2018 -1.320 -2.344 -3.466 -0.514 -2.587 





 For indexes built on data that excludes paintings originally priced at their “hammer price,” and excludes bought-ins: 
ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-














For indexes built on data that excludes paintings originally priced at their “hammer price,” and includes bought-ins: 
ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-















Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.627 -2.094 -2.680 -0.270 -2.055 -1.974 
2005 -1.597 -2.210 -2.787 0.019 -2.169 -3.877 
2006 -0.635 -1.629 -2.709 0.465 -2.614 -1.853 
2007 -0.330 -1.767 -3.665 1.571 -1.989 -0.672 
2008 -0.878 -1.867 -3.860 0.307 -2.337 -0.867 
2009 -1.676 -2.260 -3.569 -0.800 -2.566 -1.958 
2010 -1.650 -2.395 -3.743 -0.564 -2.671 -2.009 
2011 -1.679 -2.072 -3.885 -0.629 -2.768 -2.218 
2012 -1.630 -2.163 -4.005 -0.732 -2.863 -2.216 
2013 -1.759 -2.374 -4.110 -0.622 -2.952 -2.377 
2014 -1.706 -2.477 -4.227 -0.714 -2.749 -2.409 
2015 -1.843 -2.688 -4.490 -0.628 -2.985 -2.575 
2016 -1.786 -2.762 -4.275 -1.093 -3.085 -2.658 
2017 -1.568 -2.751 -3.509 -0.961 -3.002 -2.719 
2018 -1.799 -2.915 -3.614 -0.953 -3.287 -2.678 
2019 -1.935 -3.003 -3.495 -1.215 -3.363 -2.851 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.910 -1.938 -3.056 -0.372 -1.888 -2.229 
2005 -1.889 -2.058 -3.237 0.028 -1.905 -4.458 
2006 -0.878 -1.133 -2.940 0.388 -2.210 -1.619 
2007 -0.332 -1.240 -3.819 1.292 -1.681 -0.512 
2008 -0.986 -1.429 -4.004 0.391 -2.186 -0.844 
2009 -1.675 -1.919 -3.804 -0.918 -2.350 -1.805 
2010 -1.636 -1.968 -4.008 -0.653 -2.455 -1.831 
2011 -1.651 -1.532 -4.159 -0.784 -2.536 -2.019 
2012 -1.625 -1.722 -4.282 -0.789 -2.625 -2.022 
2013 -1.749 -1.932 -4.392 -0.681 -2.660 -2.174 
2014 -1.668 -2.014 -4.518 -0.847 -2.354 -2.182 
2015 -1.832 -2.238 -4.776 -0.745 -2.662 -2.381 
2016 -1.836 -2.263 -4.488 -1.133 -2.699 -2.436 
2017 -1.650 -2.235 -3.678 -1.080 -2.668 -2.531 
2018 -1.738 -2.450 -3.622 -1.187 -2.879 -2.460 






For trimester-based indexes that exclude bought-ins: ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions 
that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, which 














For trimester-based indexes that exclude bought-ins: ADF t-stats for each year of the forward recursive ADF regressions 
that begins with a window size of 10. The highest t-stat in each market is the SADF t-stat for that market, which 














Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.08 -1.52 -2.21 0.01 -2.92 -2.58 
2005 -1.52 -1.45 -2.16 -0.18 -3.21 -3.13 
2006 -0.52 -0.16 -2.39 0.46 -3.25 -1.77 
2007 -0.23 -0.72 -3.02 1.37 -2.24 -0.69 
2008 -0.70 -1.39 -3.17 0.89 -1.89 -1.33 
2009 -1.41 -1.23 -2.77 -0.66 -2.28 -1.94 
2010 -1.41 -1.66 -2.93 -0.43 -2.44 -1.83 
2011 -1.40 -1.32 -3.07 -0.49 -2.53 -2.20 
2012 -1.26 -1.70 -3.18 -0.21 -2.59 -2.18 
2013 -1.14 -1.87 -3.27 -0.33 -2.35 -2.37 
2014 -1.30 -1.86 -3.41 -0.58 -2.17 -2.42 
2015 -1.38 -2.13 -3.43 -0.32 -2.43 -2.55 
2016 -1.21 -2.14 -3.57 -0.64 -2.45 -2.63 
2017 -1.35 -2.15 -3.38 -0.88 -2.46 -2.65 
2018 -1.32 -2.34 -3.47 -0.51 -2.59 -2.65 
2019 -1.61 -2.22 -3.42 -1.07 -2.67 -2.78 
 
Aggregate 19th Euro American PW & C I &M OM 
2004 -1.53 -2.33 -2.39 -0.10 -1.96 -3.12 
2005 -1.64 -1.88 -2.41 -0.16 -2.11 -3.60 
2006 -0.48 -0.64 -2.54 0.41 -2.06 -1.38 
2007 0.06 -0.57 -2.98 1.38 -1.31 -0.41 
2008 -0.84 -1.53 -3.18 0.88 -1.47 -1.47 
2009 -1.44 -1.44 -2.63 -0.62 -1.84 -1.82 
2010 -1.48 -1.78 -2.68 -0.41 -1.99 -1.78 
2011 -1.40 -1.38 -2.84 -0.35 -2.10 -2.00 
2012 -1.33 -1.88 -2.92 -0.20 -2.19 -1.96 
2013 -1.28 -2.03 -3.04 -0.23 -2.07 -2.17 
2014 -1.30 -1.94 -3.16 -0.49 -1.71 -2.22 
2015 -1.43 -2.29 -3.20 -0.25 -2.16 -2.34 
2016 -1.30 -2.35 -3.34 -0.62 -2.11 -2.38 
2017 -1.48 -2.44 -3.13 -0.85 -2.25 -2.48 
2018 -1.34 -2.52 -3.08 -0.39 -2.31 -2.47 




Additional Summary Statistics 
Figure 1A 
 Shows density of 19th Century European Sales by Year of Work. NOTE: Not all paintings are dated. These are missing 
data points in these density distributions. Paintings painted more recently are more likely to be dated, so this distribution 
is biased towards the present. 
 
Figure 2A 
Shows density of American Sales by Year of Work. NOTE: Not all paintings are dated. These are missing data points in 
these density distributions. Paintings painted more recently are more likely to be dated, so this distribution is biased 
































Shows density of Post-War & Contemporary Sales by Year of Work. NOTE: Not all paintings are dated. These are 
missing data points in these density distributions. Paintings painted more recently are more likely to be dated, so this 
distribution is biased towards the present. 
 
Figure 4A 
Shows density of Impressionist & Modern Sales by Year of Work. NOTE: Not all paintings are dated. These are missing 
data points in these density distributions. Paintings painted more recently are more likely to be dated, so this distribution 
































Figure 5A  
Shows density of Impressionist & Modern Sales by Year of Work. NOTE: Not all paintings are dated. These are missing 
data points in these density distributions. Paintings painted more recently are more likely to be dated, so this distribution 






























 Shows the frequency of painting prices as % of Low Estimate. This frequency distribution is built using “premium 
prices” only – i.e, the hammer price that someone actual bids at, plus some auction fee. The right tail of the distribution 




Shows the frequency of painting prices as % of Low Estimate. This frequency distribution is built using “hammer 
prices” only – i.e, the hammer price that someone actual bids at. The right tail of the distribution is cut off, because the 
data is skewed far to the right. Hammer prices are concentrated around exactly the low estimate, suggesting buyers use 





Table 18A: Christies/Sothebys Summary Statistics 
Where “nationality” is the country from which a given auction house’s sales were sampled. Christie’s and Sothey’s have 
auction houses around the world, but most of their sales in the genres this paper examines were done at their London 
and New York locations. Because of this, this paper samples from these locations. “Hedonic Coefficient” is the 
coefficient on the auction-house dummy variable in the five-market hedonic regression that excludes bought-ins, and 
serves as a metric for each auction house’s effect on prices. Sotheby’s is the omitted/reference dummy variable. 
Numbers under each genre represent the number of sales in that genre sampled for each auction house. 
 
Table 19A: Large Auction House Summary Statistics 
Summary stats for the “large” auction houses. Where “nationality” is the country from which a given auction house’s 
sales were sampled. “Hedonic Coefficient” is the coefficient on the auction-house dummy variable in the five-market 
hedonic regression that excludes bought-in and serves as a metric for each auction house’s effect on prices. Sotheby’s is 
the omitted/reference dummy variable. Numbers under each genre represent the number of sales in that genre sampled 
for each auction house. Auction houses marked *** are grouped together as a single dummy variable in the hedonic 










American PW&C I&M OM Unclassified 
Christie's American/British 0.14 12,848 2,702 2,541 2,532 2,403 2,544 126 
Sotheby's American/British (omitted) 12,673 2,460 2,488 2,495 2,599 2,601 30 






American PW&C I&M OM Unclassified 
Artcurial French -1.37 1,150 142 1 0 716 261 30 
Audap & Mirabaud French -2.10 226 50 3 23 16 131 3 
Bonhams British -1.06 1,833 1,043 352 2 5 405 26 
Claude Aguttes French -1.57 874 66 3 166 562 44 33 
Cornette de Saint Cyr French -1.62 1,433 23 3 1,124 256 3 24 
Charlton Hall American -2.81 377 67 150 55 59 21 25 
CottoneAuctions*** American -1.43 84 13 48 15 4 2 2 
Coutau-Bégarie French -2.04 415 122 4 68 132 79 10 
Dorotheum Austrian -0.21 724 0 0 0 0 714 10 
Freeman's American -2.04 575 77 377 62 40 9 10 
Grisebach German -0.63 266 0 0 260 1 0 5 
Hampel*** German -1.43 125 0 0 0 0 119 6 
Freeman's American -2.04 575 77 377 62 40 9 10 
Ketterer Kunst German -0.93 311 0 0 296 7 0 8 
Koller Swiss -0.83 1,734 591 5 37 512 568 21 
Lempertz German -0.21 375 136 0 1 0 227 11 
Mats Art*** Israeli -1.43 75 5 0 0 69 0 1 
Nagel*** German -1.43 25 0 0 0 1 24 0 
Neal Auction Company American -1.99 522 88 315 74 29 8 8 
New Orleans Auctions American -2.32 500 136 209 74 62 8 11 
Shannon's American -0.80 599 12 518 22 39 5 3 
Tajan French -1.51 1,191 76 0 106 551 431 21 
Van Ham German -1.43 75 0 0 0 0 73 2 






Table 20A: Medium/Small Auction House Summary Statistics 
Summary stats for the “small” auction houses. Where “nationality” is the country from which a given auction house’s 
sales were sampled. “Hedonic Coefficient” is the coefficient on the auction-house dummy variable in the five-market 
hedonic regression that excludes bought-in and serves as a metric for each auction house’s effect on prices. Sotheby’s is 
the omitted/reference dummy variable. Numbers under each genre represent the number of sales in that genre sampled 
for each auction house. Note that Phillips is classified as a “small” auction house, despite being very large. This is due to 
the methodology under which auction houses were sampled/classified (see Other Methodology: Sampling). Auction 
houses marked *** are grouped together as a single dummy variable in the hedonic regression to avoid collinearity 












American PW&C I&M OM Unclassified 
Baron Ribeyre French -1.45 172 24 1 80 40 26 1 
Barridoff American -2.07 418 21 267 87 26 11 6 
Beaussant & Lefèvre French -1.79 1,126 294 19 71 412 317 13 
Bernaerts Belgian -2.56 512 235 1 85 164 16 11 
Bloomsbury Rome*** Italian -1.43 47 4 0 8 3 32 0 
Brunk Auctions American -2.45 294 67 86 82 25 24 10 
Charlton Hall American -2.81 377 67 150 55 59 21 25 
CottoneAuctions*** American -1.43 84 13 48 15 4 2 2 
Coutau-Bégarie French -2.04 415 122 4 68 132 79 10 
Dumousset & Deburaux French -1.53 241 71 0 37 110 22 1 
Est-OuestAuctionsCo Chinese -1.41 196 7 0 142 41 3 3 
European Arts Czech -1.98 623 111 3 152 348 5 4 
Finarte Italian -0.72 355 12 3 166 38 133 3 
Fernando Durán Subastas Spanish -1.61 195 45 3 63 57 17 10 
Galerie Kornfeld Bern Swiss -0.99 281 26 3 61 181 8 2 
Germann Auktionshaus Swiss -1.42 840 22 3 566 242 2 5 
Hauswedell & Nolte German -1.66 459 55 2 177 173 47 5 
Heritage Auctions*** American -1.43 97 0 47 47 1 0 2 
Illustration House American -1.53 655 2 476 160 15 1 1 
Marc-Arthur Kohn French -0.87 957 118 7 109 223 489 11 
Martinot, Savignat French -1.63 374 170 6 20 165 7 6 
Massol French -1.61 581 137 10 105 181 135 13 
Nadeau's*** American -1.43 42 5 34 1 2 0 0 
Phillips New York American -0.44 1,057 16 41 815 183 1 1 
Pierre Berge & Associés French -1.79 457 29 2 294 87 39 6 
Pook & Pook, Inc. American -2.39 630 78 452 34 29 25 12 
Rachel Davis American -2.95 208 12 120 57 18 0 1 







The critical values in Table 5 are contingent on population parameter, 𝜂 being > .5 (Philips et al., 2014). The appendix of 
Phillips et al. demonstrates how to estimate 𝜂: first, regress the annual index on a time trend t ∈ {1, …, T) , and obtain 
the slope coefficient (α). Then estimate 𝜂 a 𝜂 = - ୪୭୥ |ఈ|
୪୭୥ |்|
. This table shows log(α), log(T), and the estimate of 𝜂 for each 
market. These estimates are found on indexes that exclude bought-ins, but incorporating bought-ins does not 
significantly alter α.   
 
Aggregate 19th Century Euro American Contemporary Impressionist & Modern Old Masters 
log(α) -3.21 -3.94 -4.33 -2.31 -3.81 -3.45 
log(T) 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 3.22 
Estimate of η 1.00 1.22 1.35 0.72 1.18 1.07 
 
Choosing the number of autoregressive lags to include in ADF tests 
I chose the number of autoregressive lags by minimizing the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). After 
running an ADF test for the maximum number of period (i.e., through 2019) at a given number of lags, k, I 
use the estat ic command in Stata to generate a BIC value. I change the number of lags and repeat. Using 0 
lags minimizes the BIC value in the aggregate market, and so I use ADF tests with 0 lags to generate this 
paper’s ADF values. 
 
Testing for Serial Correlation in Returns 
Table 22A 
Shows autoregressive slope coefficients for hedonic regression index returns using different numbers of TS DVs 
annually. There is no evidence of positive serial correlation in returns using full year indexes, and there is little evidence 
that using different numbers of TS DVs annually changes this. 
 Aggregate 19th Century 
Euro 
American Contemporary Impressionist & 
Modern 
Old Masters 
Full Year -0.036 0.059 -0.501** -0.022 -0.126 -0.297 
Half-Year -0.060 -0.039 -0.279 -0.191 -0.198 -0.348 
Trimester -0.134 -0.152 -0.275 -0.248 -0.282 -0.315 


















Shows standard deviations in returns for indexes using different numbers of TS DVs annually. There is little evidence 
that using annual DVs “smooths” returns relative to indexes using half-year or trimester DVs. SDs rise when using 
month DVs, but this is likely do to the small sample size. 
 Aggregate 19th Century 
Euro 
American Contemporary Impressionist & 
Modern 
Old Masters 
Full Year 0.177 0.151 0.333 0.197 0.297 0.364 
Half-Year 0.178 0.158 0.319 0.204 0.293 0.364 
Trimester 0.168 0.156 0.319 0.256 0.279 0.366 




Sampling**   
** Paper section 3B. describes the overarching procedure for sampling. Additional details follow: 
Databases and motivation for sampling procedure: I sample from two databases: Artnet (64% of sampled 
sales), and Askart (36% of sampled sales). The Artnet database has records on over 12 million auction sales dating 
back to 1985. Askart’s website is less specific about their records, but contains “millions of auction results” from 
1987 onward. Both databases have limits on auction record searches/views, and Askart has scarce data from before 
2007. “Searches” entail the first 100 results that come after searching for sales from a particular artist, or sales from 
a set of auction houses. Because of these limiting factors, I had to derive a way to sample art records that, 1. 
Maximized the effectiveness of each search, and 2. Provided a sample that was as representative as possible of each 
market. This led me to sample within groups of auction houses. Sampling by auction house allows sampling from 
sales within each genre – for example – many auction houses hold “American Art” sales. Sampling annual 
“American Art” sales within a sample of auction houses 1. Guarantee that a search is drawing “American Art” (i.e., 
no wasted searches on irrelevant genres) and 2. Ensures that data samples from a variety of artists within genres. 
This second point is particularly important: my sampling procedure results in sampling over 2000 unique artists in 
each genre – presumably capturing a broad cross-section of different quality paintings within genres. 
Auction house selection and sizes: Paper section 3B describe the “cluster sampling” that the paper does between 
groups of auction houses. I do this in hopes of capturing how the entire market is doing – not just Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s – and sample ~50% of sales from auction houses other than Christie’s and Sotheby’s. I measure size of 
“auction houses” based on the number of sales each auction house has since 1995 in the Artnet database. “Large” 
auction houses are houses with more than 8,000 sales listed since 1995 (i.e., auction houses that have averaged more 
than 320 sales a year over 25 years), and auction houses with fewer than 8,000 sales are classified as 
“small/medium.” I use a random sample of sales since 1995 on Artprice.com to select 30 big auction houses, and 
30 small auction houses for each genre. I then calculate “genre specialization scores” for each auction house. For 
large auction houses, I take the five auction houses with the highest “specialization score” in each genre to be the 
designated group of auction houses to sample from for that genre. For small auction houses, I take auction houses 
in the order of their “specialization score” until the total sales since 1995 for all the small chosen auction houses add 
up to 20,000. Many small auction houses have few than 1000 sales since 1995, so just taking the five with the 
highest specialization scores often results in a group of auction houses with not enough sales to sample 100 sales a 
year for 25 years. 
The specialization metric: A group of “specialized” auction-houses are chosen for each genre, because it 
increases the chances that paintings are classified under the genre with which their group of auction houses 
corresponds (if they have to be classified), and thereby, that there are a similar number of auction results for each 
genre.  To find “specialized” auction houses, I develop a genre specialization score. The score is simple: I find 10 




the sampled auction houses have the highest ratio of sales of paintings done by genre defining artists for a given 
genre to total sales. The 10 “genre-defining” artists are the ten artists with the most sales in a given genre since 
1995. They follow: 
- 19th Century European: Edouard Léon Cortès, Eugen von Blaas, Giovanni Boldini, Gustave Courbet, 
Jean Béraud, Jean-Baptiste-Camille Corot, Jean-Léon Gérôme, John William Godward, Jules Breton, 
William-Adolphe Bouguereau 
- American: Albert Bierstadt, William Aiken Walker, Norman Rockwell, John George Brown, Jasper 
Francis Cropsey, Guy Carleton Wiggins, Grandma Moses, George Inness, Ernest Lawson, Eric Sloane 
- Post-War & Contemporary: Willem de Kooning, Tom Wesselmann, Sam Francis, Roy Lichtenstein, 
Robert Motherwell, Jean-Michel Basquiat, Jean Dubuffet, Gerhard Richter, Frank Stella, Andy Warhol 
- Impressionist & Modern: Camille Pissarro, Claude Monet, Fernand Léger, Louis Valtat, Pierre-Auguste 
Renoir, Pierre Bonnard, Pablo Picasso, Maurice Utrillo, Maurice de Vlaminck, Marc Chagall 
- Old Masters: Jan Brueghel the Younger, Anthony van Dyck, Hubert Robert, Luca Giordano, Lucas 
Cranach the Elder, Nicolaes Maes, Peter Paul Rubens, Pieter Brueghel the Younger, Salomon van 
Ruysdael, Claude Joseph Vernet 
I use Artnet’s search function to find the number of sales by “genre-defining” artists each randomly selected auction 
house has had since 1995, and then divide this by their total sales since 1995. While some of the “genre-defining” artists 
are recognizable, these are not necessarily the most prestigious artists in each genre. For example, our sampling captures 
the sale of the “Salvator Mundi,” the most expensive painting ever. The painting was done by Da Vinci and is partly so 
expensive because there are so few Da Vinci paintings one can buy.  
Selected Auction Houses:  
Random sampling and then selection based on specialization leads to these auction houses for each genre: 
- Large 19th Century European: Koller, Bonhams, Lempertz, Artcurial, Claude Aguttes 
- Small/Medium 19th Century European: Martinot-Savignat-Antoine, Dumousset-Deburaux, Coutau-
Bégarie, Kaminski & Co*, European Arts Investments Ltd, Massol 
- Large American: Freemans, Neal Auction Co., New Orleans Auction Co., Shannon’s, Bonhams 
- Small/Medium American: Morphy Auctions*, Nadeau's Auction Gallery, Cottone , Brunk Auctions, 
Illustration House, Charlton Hall Galleries, Barridoff Galleries, Pook & Pook 
- Large PW&C: Versailles Enchères, Grisebach, Cornette de Saint Cyr, Ketterer, Lempertz 
- Small/Medium PW&C:   Phillips New York, Galerie Kornfeld and Cie, Rachel Davis Fine Arts, 
Germann, Hauswedell & Nolte 
- Large Impressionist & Modern: Mats Art, Claude Aguttes, Artcurial, Koller, Tajan 
- Small/Medium Impressionist & Modern: Mathias-Le Roux-Morel*, Marc-Arthur Kohn S.A.S, Laurin-
Guilloux-Buffetaud-Tailleur*, Shinwa Art Auction, Est-Ouest Auctions Co, Briest , Audap-Mirabaud 
- Large Old Masters: Hampel, Koller, Dorotheum, Lempertz, Van Ham 
- Small/Medium Old Masters: Semenzato*, Baron Ribeyre & Associes, Pierre Berge, Bernaerts, 
Bloomsbury Auctions Rome, Beaussant Lefevre 
There are four things to note here. 1. Not all of the Small/Medium auction houses have results in the final sample. 
This is because they have a low number of sales and weren’t caught by the paper’s sampling procedure of sales 
within genre/size-based auction house clusters. 2. Many of auction houses intended to catch sales in certain genres 
ended up capturing sales across many genres (Tables 19A and 20A). 3. Some of the “Large” auction houses are 
repeated between genre clusters. For example, this paper uses Koller Auction House to sample for both Old 
Masters and 19th Century European art. This is because large auction houses have a broader scope and enough data 
points to sample for multiple genres. 4. Phillips Auction house – one of the biggest auction houses in the world – is 
classified as “small.” This is because its New York location has fewer than 8,000 sales listed on Artnet. Generally 
though, bigger art houses have more sales listed on Artnet. This is confirmed by Artprice’s listing of Top 15 houses 
by auction turnover in 2019. This paper’s sampling procedure captures 5 of the 13 biggest auction houses after 




Classifying Unidentified Paintings and Genre Definitions 
The three genre classification waves: 
1. If possible, I sampled results from auction sales named after a given genre. For example, 
“American Art Sale.” However, small/medium auction houses rarely named their sales. Large 
auction houses and Christie’s and Sotheby’s consistently labeled their sales, but often had joint-
genre sales, for example “Old Masters & 19th Century European.” The first wave of genre 
classification used single-genre sale titles to classify the paintings in those sales. For example, all 
paintings in a “American Art” sale were classified as “American.” Paintings in sales “Old Masters 
& 19th Century European” were left unclassified. 
 55.3% of paintings (28,118) are classified based on auction sale title 
2. If any of the remaining unclassified paintings were made by an artist who had other paintings 
consistently classified as a specific genre, I classify them under the same genre as the rest of their 
paintings. I use 80% to measure consistency. For example, William Aiker Walker had many 
paintings sold at auctions without sale titles. These paintings went unclassified in the first wave. 
However, 100% of his paintings that had been classified in the first wave of classification were 
classified as “American.” Because of this, his paintings that went unclassified in the first wave 
were classified as “American” in the second wave. 
 30.2% of paintings (15,395) are classified based how other paintings by their artist were 
classified  
3. For the remaining paintings, I found the nationality of the artist, and the year each painting was 
painted. If I could not find a year the painting was painting, I estimated a year using an average of 
the artist’s birth and death date (if the artist was still living, I automatically classified their work as 
“Post-War & Contemporary”). Using nationality and a year of work, I manually classified each 
painting, based on “genre definition” (see next section). However, some paintings did not fit into 
any of the paper’s five genres and went unclassified.  
 13.2% of paintings (6,734) are manually classified as a genre 




















19th Century European Art 
o Description: 19th Century European art that preceded the impressionist and modern movements. 
Movements within 19th European Art include Symbolism, Orientalism, Realism, and Academic 
schools. 
o Classification: If artist is European and their work is made between 1800 and 1900, I “manually 
classify” their paintings as 19th Century European in the third wave of genre classification.  
American Art 
o Description: Art made by American artists from the 18th through early 20th century. Movements 
include the Hudson River School, American Impressionism, American Romanticism, and 
American Modernism.  
o Classification: If artist is American, and their work is made between 1700 and 1945, I “manually 
classify” their paintings as American in the third wave of genre classification. 
Post-War & Contemporary Art 
o Description: Art made between the end of the Second World War (1945) and the present 
o Classification: Any work made since 1945 (regardless of artist nationality) is classified as Post-War 
& Contemporary in the third wave of genre classification. 
Impressionist & Modern Art 
o Late 19th and early 20th century movements that include Impressionism, Fauvism, Cubism and 
Surrealism. Impressionism started in Europe, but “Modern” movements existed in Asia, Latin 
American, and the United States 
o Classification: If paintings are made between 1900 and 1945 by non-American artists, I classify 
them as “Impressionist & Modern” in the third wave of genre classification.  
Old Masters Art 
o European art made before the 19th century.  



















Repricing Hammer Prices 
Table 24A 
Roughly 30% of paintings in the sample had prices listed as the “hammer price.” I reprice the paintings with “hammer 
prices” using estimated auction fees for each relevant auction house below. This is similar to what other papers like 
McAndrew et al. (2012) done, but instead of using Christie’s auction fees as an estimate for the rest of the market, I find 
each auction house’s auction fee. While some auction houses have a flat fee across all prices for paintings, some have 



















Audap & Mirabaud All Prices 22.6% 
      
Baron Ribeyre All Prices 28.0% 
      
Barridoff < $500,000 22.0% > $500,000 17.0% 
    
Beaussant & Lefèvre All Prices 27.0% 
      
Bernaerts*** All Prices 24.3% 
      
Bloomsbury Rome < $500000 25.0% $500000-
$1000000 
20.0% >1000000 12.0% 
  
Bonhams < $3000 27.5% 3000-400000 25.0% $400000-
$4000000 
20.0% 4,000,000 13.9% 
Brunk Auctions All Prices 23.0% 
      
Charlton Hall All Prices 23.0% 
      




Claude Aguttes < $150000 27.0% > 150,000 25.0% 
    
Cornette de Saint 
Cyr 
< $20000 24.0% $20,000-
$600,000 
20.0% >$600,000 12.0% 
  
CottoneAuctions All Prices 18.0% 
      
Coutau-Bégarie All Prices 24.0% 
      




22.0% >$600000 15.0% 
Dumousset & 
Deburaux*** 
All Prices 24.3% 
      
Est-
OuestAuctionsCo 
All Prices 21.0% 
      
European Arts All Prices 24.3% 
      
Freeman's < $300,000 25.0% $300,000-
3,000,000 




< $500,000 20.0% $500,000 - 
$2,000,000 






20.0% > $400,000 15.0% 
  
Hampel All Prices 29.5% 
      
Hauswedell & Nolte All Prices 24.3% 
      
Ketterer Kunst < $500,000 32.0% >$500,000 27.0% 
    
Koller <$10,000 25.0% $10,000- 
$400000 
22.0% >$400,000 15.0% 
  
Lempertz <$400,000 24.0% >$400,000 20.0% 
    
Marc-Arthur Kohn <$500,000 25.0% >$500,000 21.0% 
    
Martinot,Savignat All Prices 24.3% 
      
Massol All Prices 24.3% 
      
Nadeau's All Prices 22.0% 
      
Nagel All Prices 27.0% 
      
Neal Auction 
Company 
<$200,000 22.0% >$200,000 10.0% 
    
New Orleans 
Auctions 
All Prices 25.0% 
      
Pierre Berge & 
Associés 
<$200,000 22.0% >$200,000 17.0% 




Pook&Pook,Inc. All Prices 22.0% 
      
Rachel Davis All Prices 26.0% 
      
Shinwa <$18,600 16.2% $18,600 - 
$495,000 
13.0% >$495,000 10.8% 
  
Shannon's All Prices 24.3% 
      
Tajan <$150,000 25.0% $150,000- 
$2,000,000 
20.0% > $2,000,000 12.0% 
  
Van Ham <$400,000 29.0% > $400,000 25.0% 
    
Versailles Enchères All Prices 24.3% 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
